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Affärsarenan och normerna: tvisten om tvångslicens för patenterad läkemedel. 
 
en sammanfattning 
 
Den uppsatsen skrevs 2008, som slutförande av min masterexam i Intellectual Capital 
Management, på Centre for Intellectual Property Studies, i Göteborg.  
Den sammanfattningen kompletterar nu 2011, min jurist utbildning vid Handelshögskolan. 
 
Uppsatsen observerar de då senaste utfärdade tvångslicenser av patenterade HIV läkemedel 
av Thailand och Brasilien. Utfärdandet stöds av Världshandelsorganisations (WTO) reglering 
om Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS-avtalet) och orsakade stor 
internationell debatt och stridande politiska reaktioner.   
 
Det förväntade utfallet med uppsatsen är att analysera sambandet och ömsesidiga 
konstruktion och ratificering mellan affärsmässiga - och juridiska – arenorna. 
 
De tre arenorna 
Lagen och rättigheterna vilka lagen skapar och upprätthåller, som immateriella rättigheterna 
är inget mer än övertygelser som har etablerats som normer och har kommunicerats och 
åtgärdats i olika arenor i den mänskliga existensen. 
Professor Ulf Petrusson skildrar att lagen om immateriella rättigheterna är accepterade som 
norm eftersom de är framgångsrikt kommunicerade. Immateriella rättigheterna, så som patent, 
är konsekvenser från en acceptans av samhället för någonting som är hävdad i olika politiska, 
legala och affärsmässiga inställningar världen omkring. Den acceptansen kan resultera från 
manipulation, repression eller från att de tas för givet och självklara. Det resulteras, enligt 
Petrussons teori, av en kommunikativ insats som investeras på de påstådda rättigheterna. Hans 
teori, som utgör ramen för detta arbete, exponerar tre strukturella arenor som påverkar den 
nuvarande kunskapsekonomi.  
 
Den administrativa arenan 
 Aktörerna i den arenan är till exempel statliga myndigheterna som är nödvändiga för de som 
vill erhålla vissa rättsliga status, så som patent- och registreringsverket och skatt myndigheter.  
Den administrativa arenan är fast baserad på Staten, sina institutioner och regleringar, vilket 
tillåter en lägre nivå flexibilitet.  
 
Den rättsliga arenan 
Den arenan utgörs främst av domstolarna men även av aktörer som domaren, jurister och 
åklagare. I den rättsliga arenan den legala status och rättigheterna upprätthålls och valideras 
vid tvist mellan patenthavare och de som gör anspråk på det patenterade objektet.  
 
Den affärsmässiga arenan 
Den affärsmässiga arenan utgörs av flera strukturer. Några sådana är marknader, innovatörer, 
nätverk, media, etc. För företag som har en stark fokus och beroendet på immateriella 
rättigheter, så som läkemedelsföretag, är det viktigt att de andra aktörerna observerar deras 
rättigheter. Det beror på att det reflekterar deras möjligheter att utföra framgångsrika affärer 
överhuvudtaget.  
 
Samspelet mellan arenorna 
I Petrussons teori ses den administrativa arenan och den rättsliga arenan till stödstrukturer till 
den affärsmässiga arenan. Vilket orsakar beroendet mellan arenorna. 
 
Intressen från branschens lobbyorganisationer, nationella regeringar från både utvecklade och 
utvecklingsländer och administrativa och rättsliga myndigheter spelar en stark roll i 
utfärdandet och utförandet av viktiga internationella dokument som TRIPS-avtalet och Doha 
deklarationen. Denna uppsatsen avser att visa hur samspelet mellan arenorna har påverkat och 
har manipulerats med avsikt att stödja olika intressen.  
 
Tvångslicenser  
En tvångslicens medför att någon mot patenthavarens vilja får rätt att tillverka kopior av 
exempelvis läkemedel.  
 
2001 i Doha, som är huvudstaden i Qatar, Världshandelsorganisationen höll en 
ministerkonferens där antogs deklarationen om TRIPS-avtalet och folkhälsa 
(Dohadeklarationen). TRIPS betonade att immaterialrättsligt skydd är viktigt för utveckling 
av nya läkemedel men i Dohadeklarationen poängterades att TRIPS-avtalet kan och bör 
genomföras på ett sätt som stödjer alla WTO-medlemmars rätt att skydda folkhälsan och 
främja tillgången till läkemedel. Tvångslicens bestämmelser kommer för att särskilt bekräfta 
TRIPS-avtalets flexibilitet för dessa syften.  
 
2003 togs ett beslut som möjliggjorde att tvångslicenser kan utfärdas för tillverkning av 
läkemedel för export till länder som saknar egna möjligheter att tillverka sina egna. Detta 
betyder att i samband med allvarliga folkhälsoproblem, som HIV, tuberkulos, malaria och 
andra epidemier, kan kopior av läkemedel importeras med hjälp av tvångslicenser.  
 
Blad drygt tio exemplar på läkemedelspatent tvångslicenseringar runt omkring världen som 
citeras i den ursprungliga uppsatsen utförskar jag sammanfattningsviss endast den thailändska 
och den brasilianska.  
 
Thailands tvångslicensering 
Sen 2006 har den thailändska regeringen för första gången annonserat tvångslicensering av 
två patenterade antiretrovirala läkemedel för HIV/Aids patienter. Dessa läkemedel var 
Efavirenz, tillverkad och marknadsförd av Merck, Sharp and Dohme under namnet Stocrin, 
och Lopinavir/Ritonavir, tillverkad och marknadsförd av Abbot Laboratories under namnet 
Kaletra. Regeringen i Thailand har även tvångslicenserat en antikoagulantia för behandling ab 
hjärtsjukdom Clopidogril, tillverkad och marknadsförd av Sanofi-Aventis under namnet 
Plavix.  
 
Brasiliens tvångslicensering 
Brasilien har också använt patenttvångslicensering för att tillåta lokala läkemedelsleverantörer 
att producera kopior av HIV/Aids läkemedel. 2001 började Brasilien hota med att använda 
tvångslicensiering av läkemedel som ”lopinavir”, tillverkade av Abbott Laboratories, 
”nelfinavir” från Merck Sharp och ”tenofovir” från Gilead om priserna inte sänktes. Med vid 
den tiden, på grund av ganska konfidentiella avtal, avhöll Brasilien sig från utfärdandet som 
sådant. 
 
2007 utfärdar dock Brasilien en tvångslicens om Merck:s efavirenz. 
 
Lagligt stöd för tvångslicensering 
TRIPS-avtalet från 1995 är en milstolpe i immateriella rättighetens historia. Det skapar nya 
möjligheter för verkställighet av immateriella rättigheter på internationell och nationell nivåer 
och binder sina undertecknar till normer för skydd av de flesta former av dessa rättigheter.  
Men framförallt tillåter TRIPS en mycket lättare patentering av läkemedel och 
läkemedeltillverkningsprocesser än det som stod till buds förut.  
 
En bestämmelse som ger balans till TRIPS-avtalet vad det gäller läkemedels patenterbarhet är 
den om tvångslicensering. Avtalet uttömmer inte uppräkningen av de omständigheter under 
vilka tvångslicenser får användas. Men det inrättar förfaranden som undertecknarna förväntas 
följa när de beviljar tillstånd och ger vissa villkor för detta. De förfaranden och villkor 
varierar beroende på sammanhang där tvångslicensen är anställd.  
 
Artikel 31 i TRIPS-avtalet medger att medlemsstater har rätt att använda, eller tillåta andra att 
använda en patenterad uppfinning utan tillstånd från rättighetsinnehavaren om ”lagstiftningen 
hos en medlemsstat medger annan användning”, men det klargör inte vad en medlems lag 
måste säga innan sådan användning är tillåten och räknar heller inte vad som är grunderna för 
rättfärdigande av icke auktoriserade användning. Vissa allmänna villkor för utfärdande av 
tvångslicens dock anges: nationella nödsituationer, annan extrem brådska, offentlig icke-
kommersiell användning, konkurrenshämmande metoder och beroende patent.  
 
Dessa bestämmelser i TRIPS-avtalet avser att ge en tydlig balansgång, inrättande av en 
medlemsstats rätt att utfärda tvångslicenser medan det försöker skydda rättigheter för den 
patentinnehavaren.  
 
Vid Världshandelsorganisationens ministerkonferens i Doha 2001 antog WTO:s medlemmar 
en särskild deklaration om frågor som rör TRIPS-avtalet och folkhälsa. Dohadeklarationen 
visar att WTO:s medlemmar har överenskommit att i de fall där det finns konflikt mellan 
immateriella rättigheter och folkhälsa bör den förstnämnda inte utgöra ett hinder för 
förverkligandet av den senare.  
 
Reaktion till tvångslicensering 
Redogörelsen för yttrande om den thailändska och den brasilianska tvångslicenseringen i 
engelskspråkliga medier är mycket märkligt. Det betecknar en angelägen insats från båda 
sidor i konflikten att fånga massornas benägenhet. I den ena sidan, den pro 
läkemedelsföretagen lobbyn försöker, till varje pris, demoralisera den thailändska och den 
brasilianska regeringen och deras verksamhet om sjukvården samt helheten av systemet för 
immateriella rättigheter i dessa länder. På den andra sidan står en myriad av aktivister, 
akademiker och regeringsföreträdare som stödjer och erkänner sig inspirerad av dessa två 
länders åtgärder.  
 
 
Analys och Slutsatsen 
Thailand och Brasilien var inte de enda länderna att använda sig av patent tvångslicensering 
åtgärder i allmänhetens intresse för icke-kommersiell användning. Varför har just deras 
handlingar orsakat så mycket uppståndelse? 
 
2008 när jag undersökte frågan kämpade Thailand för att återupprätta ett demokratiskt 
politiskt system. Dessutom hade Thailand tvångslicenserat även medicin för hjärtsjukdomar 
och var på väg att tvångslicensera cancermediciner. Brasilien har en historia av konflikter om 
tvångslicensiering av patent medicin och ständigheter som korruptionsskandaler och våld i 
sina städer har placerat landet under bevakelse av den utvecklade världen. 
 
Både Thailand och Brasilien anklagades hårt för brott mot patenträtt. Men i verkligheten hade 
båda länderna lagligt stöd för sina tvångslicenseringar. Dessutom bryter inte deras agerande 
med läkemedelsindustripatent, dessa har inte återkallats. De fortsätter att drivas och sina ägare 
fortsätter vara Merck och Sanofi-Aventis. Merck och Sanofi-Aventis får även royalty baserat 
betalning på tvångslicenseringar.  
 
Det starka motståndet från industrin och även från några statliga organ mot Brasiliens och 
Thailands åtgärder är av en sådan kraftfullhet som föreslås ha en avskräckande effekt för 
mindre ekonomier. Motståndet kanske inriktar sig som exempel för länder som eventuellt 
överväger liknande åtgärder på folkhälsoområdet men kanske saknar den juridiska eller 
politiska resurser att försvara sig på den globala scenen. Attackerna mot Brasilien och 
Thailand kanske är ett exempel på vad som kan göras mot andra länder som vågar göra 
detsamma.  
 
En av mina viktigare slutsatser från detta är att lagen, på egen hand, inte har styrkan att 
producera de resultat som den var avsedd för. Lobbyn, dominerande ställning och 
kommunikativ styrka spelar faktiskt en roll i tvister, även när lagen redan finns. 
 
Frågan om tvångslicensering för patenterat läkemedel har dessutom vunnit en nästan folklig 
status och har definitivt satt ämnet på det vardagliga diskussionsbordet. Människor som förut 
kanske inte hade någon åsikt om de immateriella rättigheterna fick veta om konflikten mellan 
folkhälsan och intressen för vinst, eller var det en konflikt mellan korrupta länder och de som 
utvecklar botemedel för sjukdomar? Tack vare tvångslicensering för patent och den nu mera 
aktuella frågan om fildelningen på nätet har medborgare över hela världen fått möjlighet att 
informera sig om och att bilda sig en uppfattning om immateriella rättigheters paradoxala 
nyanser.  Detta bidrar för en möjlig förbättring av systemet, ett system som har potential att 
förbättra den mänskliga tillvaron i vår planet.  
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Abstract 
The recent issuance of compulsory licenses of HIV patented drugs by 
Thailand and Brazil, supported on the provisions of the WTO´s Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS 
Agreement), raises great debate in the international arena.  
 
Observing this case, the legal norms on which it is based, examples of 
different uses of this institute and the contrasting public reactions to the 
matter, the expected outcome is to appreciate the important relation of 
mutual construction and ratification between the business and the legal 
arenas.  
 
As the public priorities of the society and the notion of justice evolve, so do 
the law and the acceptable ways of enforcing it. The people’s understanding 
of what is right and what is wrong and how they act upon this, influences the 
concepts of what is legal. What is communicated in the business – and 
political arena, tends to have direct influence in the public opinion. Which, 
by its turn, influences the daily events that affect the lives of millions. 
 
The law, on its own, does not have the strength to produce the results it was 
intended for. Some of the reasons could be the very nature of the law in 
question, its relation to the society it is intended to rule, the business forces 
and international relations. The reactions to the use of a legal instrument 
must be pre analysed and taken into consideration by those that intend to 
take an innovative step in the international relations and business arenas. As 
can be seen in this study, the counteract from the lobbyists and from the 
governments that support them can be fierce and can actually harm the 
political and social harmony of entire nations. 
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1 Introduction 
The recent issuance of compulsory licenses of HIV patented drugs by 
Thailand and Brazil, supported on the provisions of the WTO´s Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS 
Agreement), has raised great debate in the international arena. Observing 
this case, the legal norms on which it is based, examples of different uses of 
this institute and the different public reactions to the matter, I will appreciate 
the important relation of mutual construction and ratification between the 
business and the legal arenas.  
 
1.1 Background 
Compulsory license is the term used to describe the mechanisms for non-
voluntary authorization to use patents. The most important international 
norm for the use of compulsory licenses so far is the Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which undertakes ―uses of a patent without the authorization of 
the right holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized 
by the government‖. Other important provisions are TRIPS Articles 1, 6, 7, 
8, 40, 44 and the provisions of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health. These documents of international public law are the guidelines for 
intellectual property related trade between countries in different stages of 
development. While the TRIPS Agreement embraces this kind of trade 
relation in a general perspective, the Doha Declaration discusses the matter 
of intellectual property related to public health.  With this, many attempts for 
compulsory licensing drugs in the name of the public interest have been 
made before, until Thailand’s actual issuance of compulsory licenses on 
patented drugs came to light.
1
  
 
By the time of the conclusion of this thesis, the compulsory licensing of 
patented drugs was still receiving great attention from the international 
media and the public opinion. Support and criticism have continuously been 
expressed, causing specially developing countries to refrain from using the 
legal instrument of compulsory licensing or to justify themselves for doing 
so. Pharmaceutical companies, the governments of several countries and 
international bodies join in the discussion of how to balance the patent 
rights, the public interests and the commercial ends of pharmaceutical 
research. 
 
1.2 Purpose and delimitations 
In the first section of this paper, I will analyze the legal and historical 
foundations of compulsory licensing of patents from the Paris Convention, 
to the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
                                                 
1 In late 2006, the Thai government, for the first time, announced its use of the compulsory 
licensing on two patented anti-retroviral drugs for HIV/AIDS patients (Efavirenz, 
manufactured and marketed by Merck, Sharp and Dohme as Stocrin, and 
Lopinavir/Ritonavir, manufactured and marketed by Abbott Laboratories as Kaletra) and 
another anti-coagulant for treating heart disease (Clopidogril, manufactured and marketed by 
Sanofi-Aventis as Plavix). 
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and Public Health. In the third section of this thesis, I will describe Professor 
Ulf Petrusson´s theory on the three arenas and the interaction between them, 
as an attempt to understand how is the law, the administration sector and the 
business arena correlated and mutually influenced. Which can, hopefully, 
become clearer with the analysis of the recent compulsory licensing of 
drugs. In the following part, I will provide an account of some of the 
previous cases of compulsory licensing attempts by other, developed and 
developing countries. In contrast to those examples, I will then tell about the 
cases of Thailand and Brazil, which have caused a considerable commotion 
in the business world and in the international relations of those countries 
with, specially, the United States government and pharmaceutical industry.  
 
My intention with this narration is to illustrate the dynamic relation between 
legality and claimed norms. The purpose of this thesis is to understand how 
the business arena and the legal arena are mutually influenced. By analyzing 
the compulsory licensing of patented drugs, my intention is to grasp the 
relation between these two spheres of the intellectual property existence and 
how they shape and validate each other.  
 
Due to the complexity of such theme as patent compulsory licensing, the 
following analysis will be limited. The economical and financial aspects of 
compulsory licensing of patents, valuation, royalty setting, contracts of 
intellectual property licenses or of acquisition of generic pharmaceutical 
products and specifics of different national laws will not be deeply analyzed. 
The events of compulsory licensing of patented drugs also have considerable 
influence on the incentives the pharmaceutical companies have for research 
and developing treatments for victims of diseases that tend to occur with 
more intensity in tropical or less developed countries, such as malaria and 
tuberculosis – the so called ―neglected diseases‖. This interesting perspective 
of the clash between profits and public interests in relation to intellectual 
property rights and more specifically to the monopoly allowed by patent 
rights, is not be the focus of my thesis. However, this issue will be 
commented upon.  
 
The audience for this paper might be those interested in compulsory 
licensing in general and compulsory licensing in the health care industry. 
And chiefly, those interested in how norms are constructed in that theoretical 
convergence area where the legal and the business ideals meet. 
 
1.3 Method and Material 
I have used customary legal sources such as international agreements, 
national laws, doctrines, regulations and recommendations from 
international bodies such as WIPO, WTO and WHO. These sources helped 
establishing the legal status of the patent compulsory licensing. 
 
Another important modality of source was the international media. I 
gathered an expressive collection of newspaper articles, blogg postings, 
white papers from national governments, articles from specialized sources 
such as from the web sites Intellectual Property Watch and the James Love 
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blogg  that have all presented intensive coverage on the matter. I have also 
used some polemical advertisements and public statements, some of which I 
have annexed a copy in the appendix of this thesis, in some cases only as an 
illustration for the theme and in other cases because those are no longer 
accessible.  
 
The main theoretic framework of this study has been developed by professor 
Ulf Petrusson and is taught at the Centre for Intellectual Property Studies, in 
Gothenburg. One angle of his theory that will be especially considered is the 
concept of the three structural arenas – legal, business and administrative - 
where intellectual property is designed, validated and constructed.
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Petrusson, Ulf (2004) 
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2 The Law 
This chapter opens with a brief introduction of the dynamic nature of law, 
followed by an overview of patent law and the regulation on compulsory 
license of patents. I will introduce the evolution of this legal mechanism 
from the Paris Convention, to the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha 
Declaration. The account of these international agreements adds to a rather 
solid legal construction allowing governments to the use of patents without 
the consent of the patent holder. It will also be demonstrated that medicines 
were not subject of patenting until the emergence of the TRIPS Agreement, 
which is one of the reasons why the compulsory licensing on these patents 
are so commented and disputed.  
 
As it will be commented upon, the national government can only benefit 
from the TRIPS provisions if their national laws are timely adapted to 
comply with the agreement. More on this subject will be discussed in 
sections 4, 5 and 6. 
 
 2.1 The Dynamic Nature of Law 
The law is in constant construction and it depends on the people’s approval 
to be efficiently enforced, and its evolution is closely connected to the 
evolution of the society as a whole. The society’s understanding of what is 
acceptable, what is not acceptable, what is a reasonable punishment and a 
necessary procedural, is what the written letter of the law is intended to 
mirror.  
 
In a business perspective, the law is essential for economic prosperity. In the 
absence of law, order, property rights and contracts it is likely that no one 
would take the risks for entrepreneurship and improvement. Law is what 
provides the tools to manage risks and create value. It gives a framework for 
effectiveness and allows the world to be more predictable, because it states 
the limits of fairness. 
 
The dynamic nature of the law is that it evolves, as does the humanity. The 
law of ten years ago is different than the law of today, so is the society. 
While the law establishes limits to people’s behaviour, it is people’s 
behaviour that creates the need for the law. Within its limits, the law allows 
for evolution, change and adaptation to the development of the business and 
social environment.
3
 
 
In the context of law, a special form of property is the intellectual property 
right. This is the area of law which concerns legal rights associated with 
creative effort or commercial reputations and goodwill
4
. The patent is a 
strong form of intellectual property because it gives monopoly to its owner. 
By nature, patents protect ideas, as expressed in the description and claims, 
but there are several controls on this monopoly right conferred to the patent 
owner, such as the compulsory licensing. This is an example of the attempt 
                                                 
3 Bagley, Constance E. (2005) 
4 Bainbridge, D. (2002), p. 3 
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to provide the law with balance, while allowing great privilege, such as the 
monopoly right in a patent, the law also offers a valve for such power, that 
is, the compulsory licensing. 
 
 2.2 Compulsory Licensing of Patents 
Since its origins, the establishment and spread of patent regimes has been 
controversial. In Europe, for instance, a major anti-patent movement 
emerged during the 19
th
 century. At that time, the liberalization of 
international trade was gathering momentum and patent protection was 
perceived as an obstacle to it. In 1883, the year of the signature of the Paris 
Convention, 22 countries had patent systems in place.  
 
One of the issues which seem to have met instability in the international 
arena has been the patentability of medicines and pharmaceutical processes. 
As it will be demonstrated in this chapter, up until the advent of the TRIPS 
Agreement
5
, pharmaceutical products were not subject to patentability in a 
number of countries.  
 
The compulsory licensing in general and particularly on pharmaceutical 
patents have also been controversy, having received special consideration 
both in the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration
6
.  
 
In this chapter I will introduce the evolution of the legal treatment to those 
institutions, by analysing the specificities on this concern from the Paris 
Convention to the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health.  
 
2.3 The Paris Convention 
In 1883, the international meeting known as the Paris Convention had the 
main purpose of harmonizing the patent laws adopted by various countries in 
order to facilitate protection of industrial property simultaneously in 
different states. One of the main objectives of the negotiations was the 
establishment of a single priority date for patent applications filed in several 
countries.
7
 The awareness that exclusive rights, such as the ones granted by 
the patent rights, could seriously interfere with the welfare of the countries 
led to further negotiations at the first International Patent Congress, in 
Vienna, 1873. There and then, amongst other commitments, it was resolved 
that the compulsory licensing of patents should be included in the Paris 
Convention text to be allowed in cases in which the public interest should 
require it. 
 
                                                 
5 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement) 
6 Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (hereinafter ―the 
Doha Declaration‖). 
7 Bainbridge, David (2002) 
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The Paris Convention state members conceded that a state had the residual 
power to override private interests in times of public health or military 
necessities; however, they were hesitant to adopt express proposals to limit 
patent rights.
8
 By the time of the signature of the Paris Convention the issue 
of compulsory licensing of patents remained as a possible sanction against 
abusive patent holders – particularly when they failed to work patents within 
a member state. The specifics of this possibility were left for the individual 
legislation of the member states, but the Paris Convention links the 
compulsory licensing to cases of ―abuse‖. It states as follows: 
 
―Each country of the union shall have the right to take 
legislative measures providing for the grant of 
compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which result 
from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by 
the patent, for example, failure to work.‖9 
 
The agreement also creates time restrictions for compulsory licenses 
applications and gives limitations for the license when the patentee can 
justify insufficient usage of the patented innovation.  
 
―A compulsory license may not be applied for on the 
ground of failure to work or insufficient working before 
the expiration of a period of four years from the date of 
filing of the patent application, of three years from the 
date of filing of the grant of the patent, whichever 
period expires last; it shall be refused if the patentee 
justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons.  
Such a compulsory license shall be non-exclusive and 
shall not be transferable, even in the form of the grant 
of a sub-license, except with that part of the enterprise 
or goodwill which exploits such license.‖10 
 
The local working requirement and the compulsory licensing system 
contributed to the public conciliation with the patent system, for being 
perceived as an efficient way to prevent abuses by the patentee monopoly.  
 
Another matter left for the members to legislate as they wished was the 
establishment of which industrial sectors were appropriate for patentability. 
One effect of this discretion was that many member states excluded the 
pharmaceutical industry from patentability. The general trend was to extend 
patent protection to processes and not products. Brazil for instance, excluded 
both pharmaceutical products and processes from patent protection. In India, 
while patent protection lasted 14 years for products and processes in all other 
industrial sectors, pharmaceutical products were excluded from patentability 
and pharmaceutical processes patents lasted for only 7 years. 
 
                                                 
8 E. T. Penrose, p. 640 
9 Paris Convention, Article 5A (2) 
10 Paris Convention, Article 5A (4) 
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In 1986, the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations
11
 was launched in Punta 
del Este. At that time more than 50 countries did not recognize patent 
protection for pharmaceutical products. The criticism against intellectual 
property protection for medicines was that multinational pharmaceutical 
companies could abuse their patent rights by: 
 Charging high prices for treatments, inclusive for diseases that affect 
a large number of poor people who cannot afford them; 
 Putting pressure on governments to prevent the local manufacture or 
import of less expensive copied versions of the drugs produced in 
off-patent countries; 
 Undertaking research and development on diseases of minor 
importance to poor people.
12
 
 
More than a century had passed and the advent of the TRIPS Agreement did 
not remove the relevance of the Paris Convention for the understanding of 
compulsory licensing of Patents. As we will see, the TRIPS incorporates, by 
reference, a number of the Paris Convention provisions.
13
 
 
2.4 The TRIPS Agreement and the Emergence of the Drug 
Patents 
The TRIPS Agreement, which entered into force 1 January 1995, constitutes 
a milestone in the history of intellectual property. The adoption of this 
agreement links intellectual property rights to the world trading system, it 
creates new enforcement opportunities at the international and national 
levels. The Agreement binds its signatories to standards of protection for 
most forms of intellectual property rights. Compelling its member states to, 
for instance, provide patent protection for any invention whether a product 
(such as a drug) or a process (such as a manufacturing method), not 
discriminating between different fields of technology, nor between the place 
of invention nor production
14
. The patent protection granted by the member 
states has to last for at least 20 years from the date of application.
15
 To fall 
on the scope of patentability, the invention must be new, represent an 
inventive step and be capable of industrial application.
16
 
 
These stipulations represent a major achievement for the pharmaceutical 
industry that, with the Paris Convention, could not secure these rights. 
However, as patents were not available for any pharmaceutical products in 
some countries in the pre-TRIPS era, a supplementary transitional period has 
been allowed for countries still not granting patents for pharmaceutical 
products when the WTO came into force in 1995. A 5-year supplementary 
                                                 
11 This meeting resulted in part of the embodiment of the final act signed in 1994 in 
Marrakech, of which the TRIPS Agreement is an integral part. 
12 Roffe, Pedro, pg.10. (2005) 
13 TRIPS, Article 2 (1): ―in respect of Parts II, III and IV of this Agreement, Members shall 
comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19 of the Paris Convention (1967).‖ 
14 TRIPS, Article 27.1 
15 TRIPS, Article 33 
16 TRIPS, Article 27.1 
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period was granted so the affected developing countries should start granting 
pharmaceutical products patents no later than 2005.
17
  
 
Before TRIPS, the need to ensure access to medicines to the population was 
the argument for many countries to exclude pharmaceutical products from 
patentability. Another argument was to protect national pharmaceutical and 
chemical sectors in a lower stage of development compared to the other 
countries. However, not only developing countries adopted this strategy. A 
study published by the United Nations, in 1975, listed the countries that 
excluded pharmaceutical products as patentable inventions; they were most 
of the developing countries as well as the Soviet Union, the former socialist 
countries of Eastern Europe, Austria, Canada, Italy, Japan, Spain and 
Switzerland.
18
  
 
During the negotiations for TRIPS, the arguments for a strong patent system 
in developing countries, especially on what it concerns drug patents, were 
called into question. Some of the issues that were questioned and that played 
an important role on the outcome of the discussions concerned the 
following: 
 The actual costs of R&D involved in the development of new 
drugs (especially compared to the marketing costs of 
pharmaceutical companies); 
 The important role that publicly funded R&D plays in the 
discovery of new drugs; 
 The use of patents to protect a myriad of minor developments 
and prevent or delay the entry of generic products after patent 
expiry (the strategy known as ―evergreen‖); and 
 The justification for extending to developing countries the same 
model of patent protection applied in more advanced countries.
19
  
 
These aspects of the pharmaceutical industry have continuously been reason 
for argument and concern. Another issue that raises great concern and 
controversy is the neglect, by the pharmaceutical industry, to research and 
develop cures, relieves or vaccines for the treatment and prevention of those 
diseases known to occur with more frequency in tropical countries and fall 
with stronger intensity upon the poor. A study developed by the World 
Health Organization has estimated that only 4.3% of pharmaceutical R&D 
expenditure is targeted at those health problems, such as malaria and 
tuberculosis, which primarily concern low- and middle- income countries
.20
 
According to Dr. James Orbinski, of the International Council of Médecins 
Sans Frontières 
21
, out of 1,393 new drugs marketed between 1975 and 1999, 
only 16 were for neglected diseases.
22
 Yet, these diseases account for over 
                                                 
17 TRIPS, Article 65 
18 United Nations (1975)  
19 Abbot, M. (2004) pp. 77 -100  
20 World Health Organization (1996).  
21 The Médecins Sans Frontières is an independent humanitarian medical aid agency that is 
committed to provide medical aid wherever it is needed and to raise awareness of the 
difficult situation in which those they help live. 
22 Trouiller P, et al. (2002) 
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10% of the global disease burden. In contrast, over two thirds of new drugs 
were modified versions of existing drugs, which do little or nothing to 
change the disease burden. The Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative – 
DNDi
23
, says that 90% of investment into health-related R&D has focused 
on concerns that only affect 10% of the global population.
24
 
 
On the other hand, patents are of great importance for the pharmaceutical 
industry. Since it relies on the returns from the exploitation of patents to 
recover investments in research and development and achieve profit. The 
industry claims that profits provided by global patents are fundamental for 
the discovery and development of new drugs. One of the arguments pro drug 
patenting used by the pharmaceutical industry is the dangerous of parallel 
importing. That is, if developing markets were allowed to copy the drugs, 
they would be exported to developed countries, obstructing the market were 
the industry makes the highest profits.  
 
Another complicating aspect in this debate is that other building blocks 
besides patents, such as market distribution channels, infrastructure, know-
how, and costs of production play an important role on drugs accessibility. 
The middle – and low-income countries representatives claim that by 
controlling these and yet the patent rights, the pharmaceutical industry is in 
the position of setting the prices as wishes. The industry, in the other hand, 
claims that great amounts of medicine and other forms of aid donate to 
nations in need come to get lost or expired due to corruption and total lack of 
infrastructure in those nations. 
 
These contrasting points of the debate that took place during the negotiation 
of TRIPS are still relevant and controversial nowadays, even after the Doha 
Declaration. These arguments are still been claimed by the actors in the drug 
patent compulsory licensing debate, despite what is written in the signed 
international agreements. The strength of the communicative skills of 
pictures and fierce speeches provided by the actors in this debate tend to 
overcome the cold letter of the law. But to have a glimpse of the truth in this 
issue, it is important to know what the law to which most countries
25
 have 
agreed upon says.  
 
The TRIPS Agreement establishes the global possibility for pharmaceutical 
patents
26
, yet it also allows for fundamental flexibilities to the patent rights. 
According to the agreement, the member governments have to require the 
patent applicant to disclose details of the invention and they may also require 
                                                 
23 The Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative is a non-profit drug development 
organization focused on improving the health and quality of life of people suffering from 
neglected diseases. Its main goals are to develop treatment for people suffering from those 
diseases; advocate on research and development of drugs for those treatments; and, 
strengthen the existing research capacity in countries where those diseases are endemic. 
24 For more information on neglected diseases and the efforts of DNDi go to 
http://www.dndi.org/index.asp (accessed in November 2008)  
25 On 27 July 2007, 151 countries were member of the WTO and therefore bind to the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
26 TRIPS, Article 27.1 
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the applicant to reveal the best method for carrying it out.
27
 The national 
laws shall prescribe the scope of the patentability criteria, the possibility of 
establishing exceptions to the exclusive rights
28
, such as the working 
exception, when the government allows researchers to use a patented 
invention for research, in order to understand the invention more fully; and 
parallel import of patented products, when they are obtainable in a foreign 
country at lower prices, when a patent also exists there.
29
 The government 
members may refuse to grant patents for three reasons that relate to public 
health. These are: 
1) Inventions whose commercial exploitation needs to be prevented to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health.
30
  
2) Diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for treating humans or 
animals.
31
 
3) Certain plan and animal inventions.
32 
The governments may make limited exceptions to patent rights, provided 
that some conditions are respected. For instance, the exceptions must not 
―unreasonably‖ conflict with the ―normal‖ exploitation of the patent.33 
 
TRIPS incorporates a binding and enforceable dispute settlement 
mechanism
34
 to resolve disagreements with respect to compliance with these 
standards under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which 
creates the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).
35
 The Member States are also 
entitled to impose retaliatory trade sanctions against another Member State 
that persists in non-compliance, even in sectors not related to intellectual 
property
36
. 
 
Amongst so many important statements, the TRIPS Agreement affirms that 
the state members may ―use, or permit others to use, a patented invention 
without authorization of the right holder‖37. This is the consequential 
statement that enables the compulsory licensing of patents.  
 
2.5 Compulsory Licensing in the TRIPS Agreement 
Perhaps one of the most momentous instruments for public policy in the 
TRIPS Agreement is the provision for compulsory licensing in public 
interest.  
 
                                                 
27 TRIPS, Article 29.1 
28 TRIPS, Articles 30 and 40 
29 TRIPS, Article 6, and Doha Declaration, Section 5 
30 TRIPS, Article 27.2 
31 TRIPS, 27.3a 
32 TRIPS, Article 27, 3b 
33 TRIPS, Article 30 
34 TRIPS, Article 64 
35 For detailed information regarding the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the main WTO 
agreement on settling disputes; and the Dispute Settlement Body see 
http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm#disputes (accessed on 25 July 
2007) 
36 TRIPS, Articles 21(8) and 22(6) 
37 TRIPS, Article 31 
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Compulsory licensing is an authorization granted by a government to a party 
other than the holder of a patent on an invention to use that invention 
without the consent of the patent owner. The patent itself is a concession 
from a government in favour of a particular person that hence acquires 
certain exclusive rights in the public interest. The compulsory license is a 
permission for a third party to make, use, or sell a patented invention without 
the patent owner’s consent – under which generic versions of patented drugs 
can be produced.  
 
Traditionally, the chief requirement for the issuance of a compulsory license 
is that attempts to obtain a license under reasonable commercial terms have 
failed after a reasonable period of time.
38
 More specific provisions 
concerning the compulsory licenses requirements, before the TRIPS 
agreement were set in the legislation of each state and varied between 
systems. Some of the traditional examples of situations in which a 
compulsory license may be granted are lack of commercialization of the 
invention in the territory of the patent, inventions funded by the government, 
failure to meet the demand for the product and where the refusal to grant a 
license leads to inability to exploit an important technological advance or to 
exploit a development patent. Compulsory licenses have also been used 
before on other intellectual property rights than patents, for instance, on 
copyrighted material for educational or non-commercial use. 
 
The text of the TRIPS Agreement does not state the term ―compulsory 
licensing‖. The title of the Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement is ―Other use 
without authorization from the right holder‖39, which implicitly deals with 
compulsory licensing. It also includes use by governments for their own 
purposes. This thesis will often refer to both uses under the term of 
compulsory licensing. 
 
The TRIPS did not exhaust the enumeration of the circumstances under 
which compulsory licenses could be used. But it sets up procedures that 
governments are expected to follow when granting a license and gives 
certain conditions for such. The procedures and terms vary depending upon 
the contexts in which the compulsory license is employed. The Article 31 
admits that members have the right to use, or permit others to use, a patented 
invention without authorization of the right holder ―where the law of a 
member allows for other use‖40, but it does not elucidate what a member’s 
law must say before such use is allowed and it does not enumerate what are 
the grounds for justification of unauthorized use. Certain general conditions 
for the issuance of a compulsory license, however, are stated: national 
emergency, other circumstances of extreme urgency, public non-commercial 
use, anti-competitive practices and dependent patents. 
 
The TRIPS Agreement intends to provide a distinct balancing act, 
establishing a member state’s right to issue compulsory licenses, while 
attempting to safeguard the rights of the patent holders. As an example of 
                                                 
38 As the provision in the Paris Convention, seen in the first part of this sub-chapter. 
39 TRIPS, Article 31  
40 TRIPS, Article 31 
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that, Article 31 (c), (d), (e) and (g)  (which will be analyzed further on in this 
chapter) outline strict restrictions for use of compulsory licenses, notification 
procedures and royalties to benefit the patent holder. To understand the 
intentions of Article 31 it is important to see the general objective and 
principles stated in article 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, which indicate 
the balance of interests intended by the agreement. 
 
Article 7. ―The protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the 
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological 
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations‖. (my highlight) 
 
And 
 
Article 8. ―1. Members may, in formulating or 
amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures 
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital 
importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development, provided that such measures are 
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.  
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are 
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may 
be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property 
rights by right holders or the resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology.‖ (my highlight) 
 
The open list of conditions for issuing a compulsory license, established in 
the several sections of the Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, shows that 
instead of focusing on enumerating grounds, negotiators concentrated on 
establishing a mandatory set of conditions for the compulsory licenses 
issued. The conditions where established so to minimize the negative trade 
effects of these compulsory licenses. The rules do not prevent member states 
from granting compulsory licenses, though.  
These conditions are: 
a) The authorization of compulsory licensing should be considered on 
its individual merits;
41
 
b) Before obtaining a compulsory license, the issuer must attempt to 
negotiate the license on reasonable business terms with the patent 
holder and that such efforts have not been successful within a 
reasonable period of time. Only after having failed to reach an 
                                                 
41 TRIPS, Article 31 (a) 
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agreement within a reasonable time can the compulsory license be 
obtained;
42
  
c) There are three possible waivers to the ―previous negotiation 
requirement‖: national emergency; other circumstances of extreme 
urgency; or where the proposed use is a public non-commercial use. 
In situations of national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as 
soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of public non-commercial 
use, where the government or contractor, without making a patent 
search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid 
patent is or will be used by or for the government, the right holder 
shall be informed promptly;
43
 
d) The license must be non-exclusive and non-assignable;44 
e) The scope and duration of the license must be limited to the purpose 
for which it was authorized
45
 and usually must be granted to supply 
only the issuing Member State’s domestic market;46  
f) When the circumstances leading to the grant of the license cease to 
exist, so too must the license; and ―competent authority‖ shall have 
the power to review the continuation of the compulsory licenses;
47
 
g) During the entire period of use, the patent holder must be entitled to 
receive adequate remuneration for that use, taking into account the 
economic value of the patent;
48
 
h) The decision to authorize compulsory licenses and the payment to the 
patent holder are subject to judicial review;
49
 
i) Special consideration should be given in cases where the patent 
holder is engaged in anti-competitive acts.
50
 
 
 
The Article 31, the TRIPS Agreement does not define the requirements for 
declaration of ―national emergency‖, ―other circumstances of extreme 
urgency‖ or what types of use qualify as ―public non-commercial use‖, in 
what can be understood as an effort to facilitate the balance of interests that 
it influences. The agreement is also vague on determining the economic 
values involved in the compulsory licensing. It demands the use of the 
balancing test to analyze the economic concerns of the patent holder against 
the economic capabilities of the license grantor. This balancing test and the 
final decision is within the capabilities of the Dispute Settlement Body.
51
  
 
                                                 
42 TRIPS, Article 31 (b) 
43 TRIPS, Article 31 (b), second part. 
44 TRIPS, Article 31 (d) and (c) 
45 TRIPS, Article 31 (c) 
46 TRIPS, Article 31 (f) 
47 TRIPS, Article 31 (g) 
48 TRIPS, Article 31 (h) 
49 TRIPS, Article 31 (h) and (j) 
50 TRIPS, Article 31 (k) 
51 See DSU, footnote 8, art. 3(2) – The role of the DSB is ―… to preserve the rights and 
obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions 
of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretations of public 
international law‖ 
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According to Spennemann and Braun
52
 there are a number of practical 
difficulties for the issuance of compulsory licenses as it is established in the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
Negotiation - Where negotiations to receive prior authorization from the 
patent owner are required
53
, they can be complicated and take a long time to 
conclude. 
Manufacturing - The patent specification may not provide sufficient 
information to copy the drug. In fact, in the case of some drugs, the most 
efficient manufacturing process is protected as a trade secret or by a separate 
patent, which may even be owned by a different company. 
Know-how - Many countries may lack professionals who can do the copying, 
and licensees may not necessarily be able to profitably sell the drug at a 
much lower price than that of the patent-holding firm. 
Business Arena - Politically, it may need substantial courage for a small 
country to issue compulsory license on a drug patented in the US or in a 
European Union member state. A good political relationship may be 
necessary for a guaranteeing access to the markets of the two global 
economic players. As such, a small country may consider that the trade-offs 
of issuing a compulsory license outweigh the price reduction of individual 
drugs. 
 
While the provisions for obligations and flexibilities in the text of the TRIPS 
Agreement may rest somewhat vague and may leave room for questioning 
their upholding possibilities and limitations, the outcome of the Doha World 
Trade Organization Ministerial Conference, the Doha Declaration, clarifies 
and reinforces the intentions expressed in the Agreement. The most relevant 
paragraphs of the Doha Declaration for the present study will be analyzed in 
the section that follows. 
2.6 The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health 
At the Doha World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference (9-14 
November 2001), the WTO members adopted a special declaration
54
 on 
issues related to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of intellectual 
Property (TRIPS) and Public Health. The discussion for the establishment of 
the declaration was one of the most important issues at the Conference, 
which launched a new round of trade negotiations on a broad range of 
issues
55
. It was the first outcome of a process that started in early 2001, 
                                                 
52 Roffe, Pedro et all. pg.10. 
53 TRIPS, Article 31(b) 
54 Paragraph 17 of the general Ministerial Declaration states: ―We stress the importance we 
attach to implementation and interpretation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) in a manner supportive of public health, by 
promoting both access to existing medicines and research and development into new 
medicines and, in this connection, are adopting a separate Declaration‖.  
55 The Director General of WTO emphasized the importance of this issue on the opening 
day of the Conference, indicating that agreement on public health and TRIPS was the ―deal 
breaker‖ of the new round. Pascal Lamy, the EU Commissioner for Trade, stated at the 
Conference that ―… we must also find the right mix of trade and other policies — consider 
the passion surrounding our debate of TRIPS and Access to Medicines, which has risen so 
dramatically to become a clearly defining issue for us this week, and rightly so‖. 
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when, upon request of the African Group, the Council for TRIPS agreed to 
deal specifically with the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health. 
 
Attempts to parallel import and compulsory license consistently with TRIPS 
were met with strong objections by state governments and the 
pharmaceutical industry in the period before the Doha Declaration.
56
 One of 
the most publicized cases illustrating this clash of interests is the one 
concerning the South Africa’s Medicines Act. In 1997, this African law was 
amended to permit parallel imports and compulsory licensing of 
pharmaceuticals.
57
 The US Government denounced this measure as an 
infringement of patent rights and the Office of the Trade Representative 
(USTR) designated South Africa as a Special 301 ―watch list‖ country58. At 
the time, this decision created a debate with so important dimensions that it 
is believed to have influenced the presidential campaign of former Vice-
President Al Gore
59
. The dispute between the countries was basically on the 
access to drugs at affordable prices through the implementation of TRIPS 
flexibilities. With the South African recognition of the parallel importation 
and compulsory licensing of patented pharmaceuticals in its national law, 39 
international firms, including the South African Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association, sued the President Nelson Mandela and the 
South African Department of Health. This caused an enormous mobilization 
of the international civil society in favor of Mandela, which resulted on the 
removal of the legal action against the South African government. Another 
event that followed the same pattern was the introduction by the United 
States government of a complaint against the Brazilian government in front 
of the WTO dispute settlement system. The complaint also founded on the 
Brazilian attempts to introduce the TRIPS possibilities for compulsory 
licensing and parallel importing in its legislation.
60
 This complaint was also 
withdrawn. 
 
These are examples of the circumstances that contributed to the awareness 
that the TRIPS Agreement needed clarification, further discussion and 
empowerment. The developing countries sought a declaration, not because 
of the lack of clarity in the Agreement, but as a result of the obstacles that 
                                                 
56 Roffe, Pedro (2005) 
57
 A time line of the disputes over compulsory licensing and parallel importation in South 
Africa can be found at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/sa-timeline.txt (accessed in 10 
January, 2008) 
58
 Idem footnote 57. ―April 30, 1999.  USTR announces that South Africa is placed on the 
"watch list" in its Special 301 Review, and schedules an "out-of-cycle" review for South 
Africa to conclude in September 1999.  According to USTR, South Africa's "barriers to 
trade" are parallel imports, compulsory licensing, registration of generic forms of Taxol, 
and speaking out at the World Health Assembly. "During the past year, South African 
representatives have led a faction of nations in the World Health Organization (WHO) in 
calling for a reduction in the level of protection provided for pharmaceuticals in TRIPS‖.‖ 
59 Abbot, Pedro (2005)  
60 The declared intention of the Brazilian government was to procure anti-retroviral at prices 
lower than those charged by patent owners, in the framework of its government-supported 
program against AIDS. The USA withdrew its complaint upon an agreement with the 
Brazilian government in March 2001. 
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the authorities in those countries had experience when trying to make 
effective use of such flexibility at the national level. At the time of the Doha 
Meeting, access to HIV/AIDS pharmaceutical treatment was (and still is) 
mostly critical for developing nations. What illustrates this affirmation is 
that by the end of 2005, 40.3 million people were living with HIV/AIDS, 
including 17.5 million women and 2.3 million children under the age of 15, 
96% of people with HIV live in the developing world, most in the sub-
Saharan Africa.
61
 
 
The Doha Declaration includes preambular provisions
62
, a provision aimed 
at confirming the interpretation of certain rules of the TRIPS Agreement
63
 
and two operative provisions requiring action by the council for TRIPS in 
relation to countries with no or insufficient manufacturing capacity in 
pharmaceuticals
64
, and for the extension of the transition period for least 
developed countries (LDCs) in relation to the protection of pharmaceutical 
products
65
. The first paragraph of the Doha Declaration defines the problems 
there addressed: 
 
1. We recognize the gravity of the public health 
problems afflicting many developing and least-
developed countries, especially those resulting from 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics. 
 
The reference to some specific epidemics in the text of the Declaration does 
not imply that the Declaration is limited to them. It covers any public health 
problem, including those that may be derived from diseases that affect the 
population in developing as well and developed countries, such as asthma or 
cancer. Also, although the access to medicines was the main issue that led to 
the Doha Declaration, it covers not only medicines, by any product, method 
or technology for health care. Which means that the Declaration applies to 
pharmaceutical products, processes and uses, surgical, therapeutic and 
diagnostic methods
66
, diagnostic kits as well as medical equipment. And, 
even though patents are the focus, the Declaration apples to all areas of 
intellectual property covered by the TRIPS Agreement, including protection 
of test data submitted for the marketing approval of pharmaceuticals
67
.  
 
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Doha Declaration express the state members´ view 
with regard to the role of TRIPS and Intellectual Property Rights in the 
context of public health. The text of these paragraphs: 
 
                                                 
61 Global Health Council web page http://globalhealth.org/view_top.php3?id=227 (accessed 
in 01/02/2008) 
62 Doha Declaration, paragraphs 1 to 4 
63 Doha Declaration, paragraph 5 
64 Doha Declaration, paragraph 6 
65 Doha Declaration, paragraph 7 
66 According to Article 27.3(a) of the TRIPS Agreement, member states may exclude these 
methods from patentability. 
67 Doha Declaration, paragraph 7 
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2. We stress the need for the WTO Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS Agreement) to be part of the wider national and 
international action to address these problems. 
3. We recognize that intellectual property protection is 
important for the development of new medicines. We 
also recognize the concerns about it effects on prices. 
 
With this statement, the Doha Declaration recognizes that the high prices of 
medicines caused by patent protection are part of the grave problems that 
afflict developing countries and least developed ountries and is a concern 
that needs to be addressed. The text of the paragraph 4 states de recognition 
that nothing in the TRIPS Agreement shall be interpreted as preventing state 
members from adopting measures necessary to protect public health, notably 
compulsory licensing and parallel imports. The text of the paragraph 4 reads: 
 
―4. We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and 
should not prevent members from taking measures to 
protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our 
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement we affirm that 
the Agreement can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO 
members´ right to protect public health and, in 
particular, to promote access to medicines for all. 
In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO 
members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS 
Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.‖ 
 
From this text it is possible to understand that the intention of the members 
was to indicate that in cases where there is conflict between intellectual 
property rights and public health, the former should not be an obstacle to the 
realization of the latter.
68
 The Brazilian delegation at the Doha Ministerial 
Conference that: 
 
―… In the area of intellectual property, different 
readings of the TRIPS Agreement have given rise to 
tensions. To a certain extent, it is natural that conflicts 
of interests should reflect themselves in divergent 
interpretations of common rules. But the commercial 
exploitation of knowledge must not be valued more 
highly than human life. There are circumstances in 
which the conflict of interests will require that the State 
exercise its supreme political responsibility… Brazil 
promotes and upholds intellectual property rights… 
However, if circumstances so require it, Brazil, like 
many other countries, will not hesitate to make full use 
of the flexibility afforded by the TRIPS Agreement to 
legitimately safeguard the health of its citizens.‖ 
                                                 
68 Correa, Carlos M. (2002) 
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Before the Doha Declaration, it could be argued that the Article 8.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement would mean that intellectual property could override 
public health. That is because one possible interpretations of this article is 
that public health and other reasons there enumerated permit member states 
to adopt measures such as commercialization and price controls but not to 
derogate obligations relating to the availability or enforcement of IPRs. With 
the paragraph 4 of the Declaration, however, it can be argued that the Article 
8.1 of TRIPS would not prevent derogation from certain obligations under 
the TRIPS if necessary to address public health needs.  
 
The paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration reflects the concern of the state 
members with the concept of ―flexibility‖ as applied to the obligations 
imposed by the TRIPS Agreement. In order to take advantage of these 
flexibilities, national laws must incorporate the appropriate rules in the form 
of compulsory licenses, exceptions and other relevant provisions. Those 
flexibilities are not automatically translated into national regimes and do not 
protect actors for legal actions based on national laws and regulations that 
fail to make use of the TRIPS Agreement’s flexibilities.  
 
The paragraph 5 o the Doha Declaration has four sub-paragraphs where each 
supplies a comment to different aspects of the TRIPS Agreement. To 
simplify the analysis, each sub-paragraph will be analyzed in separate.  
 
―5. Accordingly and in the light of paragraph 4 above, 
while maintaining our commitments in the TRIPS 
Agreement, we recognize that these flexibilities 
include: 
a. In applying the customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law, each provision of the TRIPS 
Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and 
purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in 
its objectives and principles.‖ 
 
This sub-paragraph 5(a) stresses the importance of the Articles 7 and 8 of the 
TRIPS Agreement for the interpretation of the Agreement, especially in 
relation to the Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties
69
. This means that not only the Doha Declaration can be regarded as 
                                                 
69
Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties - Article 31 - General rule of 
interpretation: 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to 
the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the 
treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty 
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a subsequent agreement to the TRIPS Agreement, having force of law. Also, 
that such rule should ensure that due deference to national law is given in 
appropriate cases; that is, that the flexibility given to member states is 
respected by the DSB. 
 
―5. Accordingly and in the light of paragraph 4 above, 
while maintaining our commitments in the TRIPS 
Agreement, we recognize that these flexibilities 
include: (…) 
b. Each Member has the right to grant compulsory 
licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon 
which such licenses are granted.‖ 
 
This sub-paragraph may not develop any substantive means for the 
interpretation of TRIPS, but it specifically employs the expression 
―compulsory license‖, which is not employed in the TRIPS Agreement 
itself
70
.  
 
The compulsory licensing is one of the key instruments that may limit the 
exclusive rights of the patent owner when needs to fulfill certain objectives 
of public policy, particularly in order to ensure the availability of alternative 
sources for the supply of medicines at lower prices
71
.  
 
This sub-paragraph 5(b) states what is apparent from the Article 31 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. As seen in the previous section of this thesis, the Article 
31 prescribes conditions for compulsory licensing, such as case-by-case 
determination; prior negotiation – in certain cases – with the patent owner; 
remuneration; time spam; etc. But it does not limit the grounds on which the 
compulsory licensing can be granted. Although mentioning some possible 
grounds for the granting of the licenses, such as emergency and anti-
competitive practices, the TRIPS Agreement leaves its state members the 
freedom to stipulate other grounds, such as public health or public interest.  
 
―5. Accordingly and in the light of paragraph 4 above, 
while maintaining our commitments in the TRIPS 
Agreement, we recognize that these flexibilities 
include: (…) 
c. Each member has the right to determine what 
constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances 
of extreme urgency, it being understood that public 
health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent 
                                                                                                                             
or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. 
70 The Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement uses ―other use without the authorization of the 
right holder‖ to refer to ―compulsory licensing‖. 
71 
Velasquez G. (1999) 
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a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency.‖ 
 
This sub-paragraph 5(c) reaffirms the right, stated on Article 31(b) of the 
TRIPS Agreement, to determine ―what constitutes a national emergency of 
other circumstances of extreme urgency‖ as an indubitable right of the 
member states. This sub-paragraph clarifies that a public health crises can 
represent a ―national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency‖, thus permitting the granting of compulsory licenses when 
provided for under national law
72
. And, according to Article 31(b) of the 
TRIPS Agreement, this can be done without the prior negotiation with the 
patent holder. Furthermore, by referring to ―HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria and other epidemics‖ as an emergency, signs that an emergency 
does not have to be a temporary problem, but rather a long-lasting 
condition, such as the situation of the epidemics mentioned in the sub-
paragraph. This is important because it implies that the measures taken to 
deal with an emergency can be adopted and maintained as long as the 
underlying situation persists, without temporal limitations. And finally, the 
sub-paragraph 5(c) establishes that burden on the complaining about the 
qualification of a specific situation as a ―national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency‖ is on the complaining member to prove 
that this emergency or urgency does not exist.   
 
―5. Accordingly and in the light of paragraph 4 above, 
while maintaining our commitments in the TRIPS 
Agreement, we recognize that these flexibilities 
include: (…) 
d. The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement 
that are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual 
property rights is to leave each member free to establish 
it own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, 
subject to the MFN and national treatment provisions of 
Articles 3 and 4. 
 
The parallel import under an international principle of exhaustion is another 
aspect regarded as a key component of a patent system sensitive to public 
needs. That is because this principle permits the import of a patented product 
into a country without the authorization of the titleholder or his licensees, to 
the extent that the product has been put on the market elsewhere in a 
legitimate manner
73
. This sub-paragraph support the state members that wish 
                                                 
72 A decision by the WTO’s Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) extended the transition period for least-developed countries to comply their 
national laws with the TRIPS by seven and a half years, and included commitments on 
technical assistance to help them prepare to apply the agreement. The transition period was 
due to expire on 1 January 2006; 11 years after the TRIPS Agreement came into force. 
Which means that least-developed countries will not have to provide the intellectual property 
protection, or the flexibilities, covered by the TRIPS Agreement until 1 July 2013 unless 
they graduate from being least developed. At present, 32 WTO members are least developed. 
This decision can be found at  the WTO web page 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/pr424_e.htm  
73 Velásquez, G. (1999) 
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to apply an international exhaustion principle, stating that is would be 
legitimate and fully consistent with the TRIPS Agreement to do so.  
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3 The Three Arenas  
The law and the rights it creates and enforces, such as the intellectual 
property rights and other legal phenomena, are beliefs that have been 
established as norm and have been communicated and acted upon in 
different arenas of human existence. 
 
Professor Ulf Petrusson clarifies the idea of intellectual property law being 
accepted as a norm because of successful communication of beliefs, when he 
states, ―the acceptance of the fact that intellectual phenomena do not exist in 
themselves is the clarification of the fact that each individual has his or her 
own substantial perception‖74. The intellectual property rights, such as 
patents, are the consequences of an acceptance by society of something that 
is claimed in different settings of the legal, political and business world. This 
acceptance can be the result of manipulation, repression or of the fact that 
the existence of the phenomenon is taken for granted. It is the result of a 
communicative effort invested upon the claimed rights. The intellectual 
property rights claims are validated in the daily conflicts and interactions 
between the stakeholders. For instance, if a patent is challenged in a legal 
procedure and the sentence for this procedure reinforces the legality of the 
patent, then the strength of this patent as an accepted norm is increased.  
 
Professor Ulf Petrusson has developed a theoretical framework where the 
administrative, judicial and business platforms are three structural arenas 
that influence the present knowledge economy
75
. 
 
3.1 Administrative Arena  
The actors in the administrative arena are governmental authorities 
necessary for obtaining certain legal status. Examples of such authorities are 
the Patent and Registration Offices and Tax Authorities. In order to have a 
patent granted, one must file for it at a Patent and Registration office and 
must fulfil the formal requirements for the application to be accepted
76
. 
Communicating with the Patent and Registration Offices the patentee will be 
forced to adjust his argumentation to the formal requirements of the 
institution in order to achieve his objective. The administrative arena is 
firmly based on the State, its institutions and regulations, its character allows 
to a lower level of flexibility. 
 
3.2 Judicial Arena 
The judicial arena – also called the legal arena in this thesis – primarily 
comprise of the courts, but also of its actors such as judges, lawyers and 
prosecutors. In the legal arena the legal status or rights are upheld and 
validated. When a patent is infringed, the rights holder can be forced to turn 
                                                 
74 Petrusson, p. 103 
75 Petrusson, pp. 104, 105 
76 
The formal requirements for patentability of an invention are novelty, industrial 
application and non-obviousness. 
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to the courts to stop the infringement. The infringer then might try to 
invalidate the patent, and the court will have to decide if the right will be 
upheld or invalidated. It is crucial for the intellectual property holders to 
understand the full extension of the legal norms that sustain this arena.  
 
3.3 The Business Arena 
The business arena itself consists of several structures and some of them are 
markets, innovations, networks, the media, etc
77
. Companies that have a 
strong focus and dependency on intellectual property rights, such as the 
pharmaceutical companies, it is important that the other actors in the 
business arena recognize their intellectual properties, because that reflects 
the possibility of conducting business altogether. If the intellectual property 
of an actor is perceived to be weak or non-existent it can have serious 
consequences to the core of the business. 
 
The business arena is international and is more malleable than the other two. 
The business arena and the political one are closely related and, in this 
thesis, will be considered as one. 
 
3.4 The Interaction Between the Three Arenas  
In Professor Petrusson´s theory, the administrative and the judicial arenas 
are seen as supporting structures for the business arena
78
. The supporting 
structures also create a dependency because the construction process in the 
business arena will be dependent on how the communication is handled in 
the administrative and the judicial arenas. For instance, the claims in a patent 
application, the patent law and international agreements such as the TRIPS 
Agreement, will reflect in the business opportunities for the patent holder. 
 
After the brief exposition of the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration 
in this thesis, it is possible to imagine the interaction between the legal and 
business arena, as well as the administrative aspects of these important 
international documents. The industry lobby, the national governments 
interests from both the developing and the developed world, and the legal 
and administrative protocols influenced the negotiation for the 
accomplishment of those agreements. For the construction of those 
statements, the communicative skills of each party played a role that drove 
the final decisions agreed upon by the member states. 
 
In the following sections of this thesis, I will introduce the case of 
Thailand’s compulsory licensing of HIV/AIDS patented drugs, and how in 
the interaction between the three arenas communication has been 
manipulated to support different interests.   
 
                                                 
77 Petrusson p.106 
78 Petrusson p.106 
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4 Examples of Events Related to Compulsory 
Licensing of Patents 
 
It is untrue that the granting of compulsory licenses is suspect under global 
trade rules. In fact, it is far more common than many news reports 
acknowledge. Indeed, the United States has issued several compulsory 
licenses since June 2006, including compulsory licenses that have benefited 
Microsoft, DirectTV, Toyota and Johnson and Johnson
79
. 
 
This chapter gives an account of some compulsory licensing of intellectual 
property events around the world, in developed and developing nations, 
successful and unsuccessful requests for compulsory licensing. One can find 
that there are compulsory licenses covering a wide variety of technologies, 
they are based on different legal mechanisms and grounded on different 
claims. The present account will not be exhaustive; it is intended to bring 
examples that are more directly related to the questions examined in this 
master thesis. For this reason, the examples hereby given will concern 
compulsory licensing of patents on public health interests. With the 
following information, the reader might share my reflection over which are 
the reasons why Thailand and Brazil have been subject of such criticism 
when they were not the only countries to use the compulsory licensing 
possibility.  
 
4.1 United States of America 
Under the USA Law 28 USC 1498, which concerns uses of patents or 
copyrights, when the use is by or for the government, the US government 
does not have to seek a license or negotiate for use of a patent or copyright. 
Any federal employee can use or authorize the use of a patent or a copyright. 
The right owner is entitled to compensation, but cannot enjoin the 
government or a third party authorized by the government, to prevent the 
use. Any contractor, subcontractor, person, firm, or corporation who receives 
authorization from the federal government to use patents or copyrights is 
construed as use by the federal government, and cannot be sued for 
infringement.
80
 One example of the government use of this possibility 
occurred in 2001, when the Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) Secretary Tommy Thompson used the threat of compulsory 
licensing to authorize imports of generic ciprofloxacin, for stockpiles against 
a possible anthrax attack.
81
 
 
The Bayh-Dole Act gives the US government ―march-in right‖82. It allows 
                                                 
79 James Love, Racist and Ignorant Reactions on Thailand Compulsory License: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-love/racist-and-ignorant-react_b_39618.html  
80 More information about the compulsory licensing for government use in the USA: 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/us-1498.html (accessed in 10/02/2008) 
81 More information about the case known as the ―Cipro Patent Dispute‖ can be found at 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro/talkingpoints.html (accessed in 09/02/2008) 
82 
Complete information about the Bayh-Dole Act and the march-in rights can be found at 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/bd/ (accessed in 10/02/2008). Regulations governing the 
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the federal agency under whose funding agreement an invention was made 
the right to grant a license to a responsible new applicant if, among other 
things, the current manufacturer has failed to make the product available to 
the public on reasonable terms, 18 USC sections 201(f), 203(1)(a), or if 
action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not 
reasonably satisfied by the current manufacturer.
83
 In 2001, DHHS used its 
authority to exercise march-in rights for patents on stem cell lines resulting 
from publicly funded research and held by the Wisconsin Alumni 
Foundation as leverage to secure an open license on those patents.
84
 
 
In January 29, 2004, the non-profit corporation Essential Inventions 
petitioned the DHHS for compulsory licenses to manufacture and sell 
inexpensive generic versions of latanoprost (Xalatan)
85
 and ritonavir 
(Norvir)
86
. Both drugs were developed with federal funding, and the 
government has rights through the Bayh-Dole Act to "march in" on the 
patent rights and license them to another producer. On August 4, 2004, the 
National Institute of Health (NIH) turned down the request for ritonavir. It 
has not yet responded to the latanoprost request.
87
  
 
While public criticizing Thailand and Brazil for their compulsory licensing 
of drug patents, on the 12th of January 2007, Abbott Laboratories lost a bid 
in a US District Court (the Western District of Wisconsin) for a compulsory 
license on a patent held by Innogenetics, Inc. A judge and jury said Abbott 
infringed to manufacture and sell Hepatitis C virus (HCV) genotyping test 
kits. The compulsory licensing request was an effort to avoid an injunction 
that would prevent Abbott from using the Innogenetics patent without 
permission from the patent owner
88
. 
4.2   Canada 
In September 2001, the Ontario Health Minister held a speech concerning 
the Myriad Gene Patent
89
, calling for compulsory licensing of patents on 
                                                                                                                             
procedures for the exercise of march-in rights are at 37 CFR section 401.6. 
83 
18 USC section 203(1)(b) 
84 Extensive discussion on this subject does still take place. Some information about the case 
can be found at Nature: Focus on Stemcells: http://www.nature.com/nature/stemcells/  
(accessed in 10/02/2008) 
85 Xalatan is a medicine for the treatment of glaucoma http://www.drugs.com/xalatan.html  
86 Norvir is an antiviral medication in a group of HIV medicines called protease (PRO-tee-
ayz) inhibitors. http://www.drugs.com/norvir.html  
87 Miscellanea on Compulsory Licensing Programs: http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/us-
misc.html (accessed in 10/02/2008) 
88 Keionline: Abbott Recently Sought Compulsory License in US Patent Dispute: 
http://www.keionline.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=43 (accessed in 
27/03/2008) 
89 Myriad Genetics Inc., in collaboration with the University of Utah, were the first to 
sequence the BRCA-1 gene, and applied for patent protection in 1994. Together with the 
University of Utah Research Foundation and the United States of America, Myriad holds 
U.S. patents 5747282 and 5710001 on the isolated DNA coding for a BRCA-1 polypeptide 
and on a screening method. In 1997, together with the Centre de Recherche du Chul in 
Canada and the Cancer Institute of Japan, they received patent protection on an isolated 
DNA sequence, asserting rights over a number of mutations in the gene (U.S. Patent 
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genes relevant to tests for breast cancer. In January 2002, the Ontario 
Advisory Committee on New Predictive Genetic Technologies published the 
―Ontario Report to Premiers: Genetics, Testing & Gene Patents: Charting 
New Territory in Healthcare‖,90 which noted that the Doha Declaration calls 
upon nations to make measures ―to protect public health and, in particular, to 
promote access to medicines for all‖. Concerning the compulsory licensing, 
the report concludes: 
 
―In order to prevent the statement for providing a 
hollow right, the concept of promoting access to 
medicines for all must include providing access to the 
diagnostic procedures necessary to determine when and 
which medicines to provide. The federal government 
should, therefore, amend the Patent Act to specifically 
allow the potential for compulsory licensing of patent 
relating to the provision of genetic diagnostic and 
screening test should this power be necessary.‖91  
 
On May 14, 2004, Canada passed BILL C-9, an Act to amend the Patent Act 
and the Food and Drugs Act, with the purpose to allow Canadian 
manufactures to export medicines to countries lacking manufacturing 
capacity. Proposed royalties paid to the patent holder vary according to the 
importing country’s Human Development Index92. The benefits of the Act 
are limited to products listed on ―Schedule 1‖, the list of patented 
pharmaceutical products that are eligible to be exported under the 
compulsory license.
93
 On October 2007, Canada became the first country to 
authorize a company to make a generic version of a patented medicine for 
exporting. The drug, a fixed dose combination product of zidovudine, 
lamivudine and Nevirapine, is a HIV/AIDS treatment being produced in 
Canada by Apotex INC, under the name ApoTriavir. It will be exported to 
Rwanda that said to have the intention to initially import 260.000 packs of 
the medicine during two years time
94
. A notification to the WTO authorities 
completes the legal formalities allowing the export. This is the first country 
                                                                                                                             
5693473). Further patent applications were filed on the second gene, BRCA-2, in the U.S. 
and in other countries (US Patents 5837492 and 6033857). 
90 The full version of the report can be found at 
http://www.who.int/genomics/elsi/regulatory_data/region/amro/014/en/index.html (accessed 
in 02/02/2008) 
91 ―Ontario Report to Premiers: Genetics, Testing & Gene Patents: Charting New Territory in 
Healthcare‖, p.79. 
92 The Human Development Index (HDI), published annually by the UN, ranks nations 
according to their citizens' quality of life rather than strictly by a nation's traditional 
economic figures. The criteria for calculating rankings include life expectancy, educational 
attainment, and adjusted real income. 
93 The Canadian Act to amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act can be accessed at  
http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/Bills_ls.asp?Parl=37&Ses=3&ls=C9 
94 Reuters: ―Canada grants patent waiver for Rwanda AIDS drug‖, at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/health-SP/idUSL0521156720071005 (accessed in 
01/11/2007) and ―Canada confirms to WTO it will be first to export cheap, generic AIDS 
drugs‖ 
http://aol.mediresource.com/channel_health_news_details.asp?news_id=13514&news_chann
el_id=16&channel_id=16&relation_id=10584 (accessed in 02/11/2007) 
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to take action regarding the WTO agreement
95
, which has the purpose of 
facilitating for countries with public health problems to import less 
expensive generic drugs made under compulsory licensing when they are 
unable to manufacture the medicines themselves. 
4.3 European Union 
The subject of compulsory licensing of intellectual property rights and 
competition law is complex, both under the TRIPS Agreement and the 
European Law. A number of decisions by the European Court of Justice 
provide some clarity to the issue. However, as competition law is not the 
focus of the present study and it would demand specific study and research, I 
refrain from commenting on this particular modality of compulsory licensing 
within the European Union. 
 
Nevertheless, compulsory licensing of patented pharmaceutical products is 
an issue considered with careful attention by European Law. An example of 
that is the European Community Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 17 May 2006 on ―Compulsory Licensing of Patents 
relating to the Manufacture of Pharmaceutical Products for Export to 
Countries with Public Health Problems‖ 96. This regulation has the purpose 
of promoting the harmonization, within the European Union, of the 
conditions for granting compulsory export licenses for companies that intend 
to manufacture generic medicinal products for export to developing 
countries which do not have sufficient production capacity of their own. 
The regulation also aims to prevent distortion of competition among 
operators in the single European market and to apply uniform rules in order 
to avoid the re-import into the European Union of pharmaceutical products 
manufactured under the compulsory export licenses. 
 
4.4 France 
France amended its law No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992,
97
 on the Intellectual 
Property Code to allow the broader use of compulsory licenses – referred to 
as ―ex-officio licenses‖, and in particular, to authorize the government to 
issue ex-officio licenses to patents on certain diagnostic technologies. The 
article L. 613-16 of the amended law provides that: 
 
―Where the interest of public health demand, and 
in the absence of a voluntary agreement with the 
patent holder, the minister responsible for 
industrial property, may, by order of the minister 
responsible for public health, request ex-office 
licenses in accordance with Article L, 613-17 for 
any patent granted for: a) a medicine, a medical 
                                                 
95 This WTO agreement, so called ―the August 30 WTO deal‖, can be found at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm (accessed in 06/01/2008) 
96 Accessible at http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l21172.htm (accessed on 9/02/2008) 
97 A version in English of the French intellectual Property Law can be found at 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/france1.html (accessed in 11/02/2008) 
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device, a medical device for in vitro diagnosis, a 
related therapeutic product; b) processes for 
obtaining them, or for products necessary in 
obtaining such medicines of for processes for 
manufacturing such products; c) a diagnostic 
method ex vivo.‖ 98 
 
In October 2001, several notices of opposition to the European patent EP 
699 754 held by Myriad Genetics relating to a ―method for diagnosing a 
predisposition for breast and ovarian cancer‖ were filed at the EPO. In 
France, the Institut Curie, the Assistance Publique–Hôpitaux de Paris and the 
Institut Gustave-Roussy, filed a joint notice of opposition. The French 
Federation of Cancer Centers and the French Hospital Federation, the French 
Ministries of Public Health and Research, and the European Parliament 
supported this initiative. Further notices of opposition were filed by a group 
led by the Belgian Society of Human Genetics that included Belgian and 
Dutch human genetics centers, as well as by the genetics societies of 
Germany, Denmark and Great Britain.
99
 In a Communiqué issued by M. 
Roger-Gérard Schwartzenberg, the Minister for Research of the French 
government, he stated that the government was ―considering an ex officio 
license‖ of the Myriad Genetics’ diagnostic testing.100 In this statement he 
says:  
 
―From now on, where the interests of public health 
demand, in the event of a diagnostic test being made 
available to the public in insufficient quantity, of 
inadequate quality or at an abnormally high price, the 
State will be able to make this test subject to an ex 
officio license.‖ 
 
4.5 Italy 
 
On February 8, 2006, the Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) closed the 
investigation into the Glaxo Group’s refusal to grant a license to Fabbrica 
Italiana Sintetici SpA (FIS), for the manufacture in Italy of an active 
ingredient, Sumatriptan Succinate, used in the production of migraine 
medicines. According to the AGCM press release
101
: 
 
                                                 
98 vide footnote 84. 
99 More information at www.curie.fr and the patent files and oppositions can be found at 
www.european-patent-office.org (accessed in 11/02/2008) 
100 The communiqué can be read at http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Myriad-Genetics-
diagnostic-testing.html (accessed in 11/02/2008). 
101 AGCM. February 21, 2006. Press Release: Pharmaceuticals: Antitrust says Glaxo has 
made amends and abuse of dominant position discontinued. Granting license opens way for 
manufacture of generic migraine drugs. 
http://www.agcm.it/agcm_eng/COSTAMPA/E_PRESS.NSF/92e82eb9012a8bc6c125652a00
287fbd/634fe21dc342c220c125711d003692c3?OpenDocument&Highlight=2,patent 
(accessed in 06/01/2008) 
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―To remedy the earlier refusal to license, Glaxo granted 
the licenses originally requested by FIS, but also set 
conditions such as to allow the time to be made up 
which had been lost because of the original refusal. 
Those conditions include the granting of a number of 
additional procedural licenses, whereby Glaxo has 
allowed FIS to save the time otherwise required to 
research and test and efficient manufacturing process 
for Sumatriptan Succinate. FIS will this be enabled to 
offer the active ingredient to manufacturer of generics 
as early as if Glaxo had never refused the original 
request for a license‖. 
 
The AGCM sought to prevent delays in bringing generic pharmaceutical to 
market, thus paving the way for substantial price reductions. FIS initially 
used the compulsory license entirely for the export market, supplying 
generic firms that were selling products in markets outside of Italy (such as 
Spain), where the patents had expired. It did so outside of the framework of 
the WTO August 30, 2003 decision on exports on medicines manufactured 
under a compulsory license
102
, which Spain and other EU members had 
―opted out‖ as an importer. This was possible in part because the TRIPS 
waives all restrictions on exports in cases where the licenses were issued to 
remedy to anticompetitive practices.  
 
Another case of compulsory licensing that took place in Italy, from March 
21, 2007, when the AGCM required Merck to ―grant free licenses to allow 
the manufacture and sale in Italy of the active ingredient Finasteride and 
related generic drugs two years before the 2009 expiration of the 
Complementary Protection Certificate‖103 Finasteride is the active ingredient 
of a drug marketed initially under the brand name Proscar and Propecia. It is 
used to treat hypertrophy of the prostate, cancer of the prostrate and male-
pattern baldness. The Merck royalty free compulsory licenses were remedies 
to Merck’s earlier refusal to license the patents to Italian manufactures of 
active pharmaceutical ingredients. Again, the licenses anticipate exports to 
other European countries.  
 
4.6 Germany 
 
On May 2001, Roche and Chiron reached a licensing agreement for patents 
on blood screening HIV probe, held by Chiron. With this agreement Roche 
ended its attempts to obtain compulsory licensing of those patents, which it 
was doing by means of undertaking the German government to issue a 
compulsory license for those patents. Chiron and Roche had pending 
                                                 
102 To be found at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm 
(accessed in 06/01/2008) 
103 AGCM Press Release – Merck – Active ingredients (conclusion of investigation): 
antitrust authority rules Merck must grant free licenses for the active ingredient Finasteride 
http://www.agcm.it/agcm_eng/COSTAMPA/E_PRESS.NSF/92e82eb9012a8bc6c125652a00
287fbd/28653b373e56772ac12572ab003a4d68 (accessed in 07/01/2008).  
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litigation in the USA, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and 
Australia regarding the HIV testing technology. Among other provisions of 
the agreement that settled the dispute, Chiron agreed to grant Roche licenses 
to manufacture and sell the diagnostic tests.
104
  
 
4.7 India  
 
In February 2005, India amended its patent law, to provide for patent 
protection for pharmaceutical inventions. The legislation created a 
mandatory compulsory license for products that were already manufactured 
and marketed in India. The new provision was added under Section 11 A of 
the Indian Patent Act read as follows: 
 
(7) On and from the date of publication of the application for 
patent and until the date of grant of a patent in respect of such 
application, the applicant shall have the like privileges and rights 
as if a patent for the invention had been granted on the date of 
publication of the application:  
Provided that the applicant shall not be entitled to institute any 
proceeding for infringement until the patent has been granted: 
Provided further that the rights of a patentee in respect of 
applications made under sub-section 2 of section 5 before 1st 
January, 2005 shall accrue form the date of grant of the patent: 
Provided also that after a patent is granted in respect of 
application made under sub-section 2 of section 5, the patent 
holder shall only be entitled to receive reasonable royalty 
from such enterprises which have made significant 
investment and were producing and marketing the concerned 
product prior to the 1
st
 January, 2005 and which continue to 
manufacture the product covered by the patent on the date of 
grant of the patent and no infringement proceeding shall be 
instituted against such enterprises”105 (emphasis added) 
 
Supported by its national law, the Indian generic-drug industry is one of the 
largest in the world. As of March 2008, the first compulsory licenses to be 
issued by the country that were not automatic due to the 2005 law, are of 
product process patent on two cancer treatment drugs. The Indian Natco 
Pharma, filed an application for compulsory licensing those medicines that 
should be exported to Nepal
106
.  
 
4.8 Indonesia 
 
                                                 
104 More information and a copy of the license agreement that settled this dispute can be 
found at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/recent-examples.html (accessed in 03/02/2008). 
105 The Indian Patent Act 2005, available at  
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf  
106 The Wall Street Journal: Keen Wait for Outcome of First Case on Compulsory License: 
http://www.livemint.com/2008/03/06231231/Keen-wait-for-outcome-of-first.html (accessed 
in 20/03/2008) 
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On October 5, 2004, Indonesia issued a government use compulsory license 
to manufacture generic versions of two HIV/AIDS drugs, lamivudine and 
nevirapine, until the end of the patent term in 2011 and 2012 respectively. 
The license includes a royalty rate of 0.5% of the net selling value 
107
 
Production of the ARVs has started by PT Kimia Farma.  
 
4.9 Malaysia 
 
On September 29, 2004, the Malaysian Minister of domestic Trade and 
Consumer Affairs issued a two-year government use compulsory license to 
import from India didanosine (ddl), zidovudine (AZT) and lamivudine + 
zidovidine (Combivir) 
108
. The Ministry of Health proposed a royalty rate of 
4% of the value of the generic product.  
 
4.10 Taiwan 
 
On November 2005, Taiwan issued a compulsory license for patents needed 
to manufacture and sell generic versions of Tamiflu, a drug for the treatment 
of avian flu. Taiwan was the first country to employ compulsory licensing to 
ensure sufficient stockpiles of the drug in the event of a pandemic. 
However, in an attempt to prevent damage to Taiwan’s image in the 
protection of intellectual property rights, the cabinet’s Intellectual Property 
Office (Tipo) attached a number of conditions to the compulsory license, 
which officials said would ensure that Roche would not lose profits
109
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
107 Translated text of the license is available at http://www.lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-
health/2004-December/007233.html  
108 Translated text of the license is available at  
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/malaysia/arv-license.html  
109 Financial Times: Taiwan Employs Compulsory Licensing for Tamiflu  
 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cebeb882-5dcb-11da-be9c-0000779e2340.html  
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5 Thailand’s compulsory licensing of 
HIV/AIDS patented drugs 
One of the most important existing medicines for human immunodeficiency 
virus infection, the HIV, is efavirenz, a non-nucleoside reverse-transcriptase 
inhibitor that is available since the late 1990s. The efavirenz, in combination 
with two other medicines, ―has become a standard-of-care comparator in 
clinical trials‖110. The efavirenz is more complicated to manufacture than 
some other antiretroviral drugs, therefore it is relatively expensive, 
particularly for low - and middle – income countries. 
 
In 2006, first-line treatment regimens, that contain, amongst other drugs, 
600mg of efavirenz, the usual daily dose for adults, had a median cost of 
nearly $500 per patient per year in low – and middle - income countries, 
which represents more than three times the price of some other 
alternatives
111
. Low-income countries are those with a 2005 gross national 
income of less than $875 per capita, and middle-income countries are those 
with a 2005 gross national income of $876 to $10,725 per capita, as defined 
by the World Bank
112
. In the United States, where Bristol-Myers Squibb 
markets efavirenz as Sustive, a one-year supply costs about $6,000. In 2006, 
Merck's official price for the 600-mg of efavirenz in least developed 
countries was $277 per patient per year. In middle-income countries with an 
HIV prevalence rate among adults of 1% or greater, such as Thailand, it was 
also $277.  
 
Since October 2003, Thailand has had a policy of universal coverage for 
antiretroviral treatment and patients receive their drugs free of charge from 
the government. Their goal is to reduce the price of efavirenz so the 
government could provide the medication to additional patients while 
remaining within its budget for the treatment of HIV/AIDS. At the end of 
2005, the estimation was that 580,000 Thais were living with HIV 
infection
113
. According to the World Health Organization, in June 2006 
estimated 89,000 Thais were receiving antiretroviral therapy, which 
represents about four fifths of those who actually needed it, but less than one 
quarter of those received regimens that included efavirenz. The majority of 
the patients received the drug nevirapine, a less expensive non-nucleoside 
reverse-transcriptase inhibitor that can have negative side effects, including 
severe rash and hepatotoxic effects
114
. 
  
To increase the reach of the treatment with efavirenz so the majority of the 
patients would have access to it, the Thailand’s Ministry of Public Health 
                                                 
110 Hammer SM. (2006) 
111 Steinbrook, R. (2007)    
112 Data are from the World Health Organization's Global Price Reporting Mechanism on 
Antiretroviral Drugs. Summary of the report can be found at 
http://www.who.int/hiv/amds/GRPM_april2006.pdf (accessed on 21 August, 2007) 
113 Data extracted from the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS.  (Accessed in 21 
August, 2007) At http://www.unaids.org/en/Regions_Countries/Countries/thailand.asp 
114 World Health Organization. Antiretroviral therapy for HIV infection in adults and 
adolescents: towards universal access: recommendations for a public health approach. 2006 
Revision. At  http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/guidelines/en/ (accessed in 21 August, 2007) 
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issued a compulsory license for the efavirenz
115
. The license had immediate 
effect and will last until December 31, 2011. It permits the Thai Government 
Pharmaceutical Organization to import generic efavirenz from India, where 
the drug is not patented, and also to produce the drug at a time when Merck 
still has it patented in Thailand.  
 
The consequences of Thailand’s action transcend efavirenz and HIV itself. 
That is because the same rationale Thailand has used to issue this 
compulsory license can be used again by Thailand itself or by any other 
country to license additional HIV drugs; drugs for other infectious diseases 
with public health consequences i.e. malaria, tuberculosis, influenza; or 
drugs for cancer and other chronic diseases.  
 
Thailand has not only compulsory licensed the patent on the efavirenz. The 
same was done with Kaletra, another anti-HIV/AIDS drug patented by the 
US pharma major Abbot Laboratories; and with Plavis, a blood thinner made 
by Sanofi-Aventis. Thailand’s actions in testing and winning the right to use 
compulsory licenses has received much praise from a large section of 
activists, patients and academics at home and abroad, it has also received a 
lot of public criticism and retaliation.  
 
5.1 The Thai National Law regarding Compulsory 
Licensing 
 
To have the authority to issue a government-sue compulsory license under 
its own law and to be able to justify it by the flexibilities of the TRIPS 
Agreement and the statements of the Doha Declaration, as see before, 
Thailand must have complied with the Agreement in its own national law, 
adding to it the specificities of the international agreement.  
 
Section 51 of the Thai Patent Act
116
 makes clear that the Thailand 
Department of Disease Control is well within its rights in granting a license 
for the public purchase and use of generic patented drugs, such as the 
efavirenz, without further negotiation with the patent holder.  The patent 
holder is given a right to appeal the terms of the license, including its royalty 
rate. The Department may, however, use the license to begin purchase of 
generic versions of patented medicines immediately, regardless of whether 
any dispute may exist or arise as to the reasonableness of the royalty or other 
terms established in the license. 
 
On 29 November 2006, the Director General of the Department of Disease 
Control of Thailand announced that is was authorizing the public use of 
                                                 
115 Announcement of the Department of Disease Control, Ministry of Public Health, 
Thailand, on the public use of patents for pharmaceutical products. November 29, 2006. 
At  http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/recent-examples.html (accessed on 21 August 2007) 
   
116 Thai Patent Act B.E.2522  
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patents on efavirenz to serve its national treatment plan.
117
 This notice, 
grounded by the Article 51 of the Thai Patent Act, states: 
 
By the virtue of provisions of Article 51 of the Thai 
Patent Act B.E. 2522 (as amended by the Thai Patent 
Act no.2 B.E. 2535 and no.3 B.E. 2542), the 
Department of Disease Control, Ministry of Public 
Health, thus use the patent right of a medicine called 
Stocrin® (or efavirenz as a generic name) and endorse 
the Government Pharmaceutical Organization of 
Thailand to exercise the rights contained within 
Paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Thai Patent Act B.E. 
2522 (as amended by the Thai Patent Act no.2 B.E. 
2535 and no.3 B.E. 2542) under these conditions: 
(1) The use of the above patent rights is effective from 
today to the 31st December 2011. 
(2) The use of the above patent rights will be limited to 
the provision of Efavirenz to not more than 200,000 
patients per year, for those covered under the National 
Health Security System Act B.E. 2545, Social Security 
Act B.E. 2533, and the Civil Servants and government 
employees medical benefits scheme. 
(3) A royalty fee of 0.5 percent of the Government 
Pharmaceutical Organization’s total sale value of the 
imported or locally produced Efavirenz will be paid to 
the patent holder. 
 
The Department of Disease Control, Ministry of Public 
Health will notify the patent owner and the Department 
of Intellectual Property, Ministry of Commerce 
immediately. 
 
Section 51 of Thailand’s Patent Act states the right of ―any ministry, bureau 
or department of the Government‖ ―by themselves or through others,‖ to 
exercise the rights in any patent ―for public consumption.‖ This section 
reads:  
 
In order to carry out any service for public consumption 
or which is of vital importance to the defense of the 
country or for the preservation or realization of natural 
resources or the environment or to prevent or relieve a 
severe shortage of food, drugs or other consumption 
items or for any other public service, any ministry, 
bureau or department of the Government may, by 
themselves or through others, exercise any right under 
Section 36 by paying a royalty to the patentee or his 
exclusive licensee under paragraph 2 of Section 48 and 
shall notify the patentee in writing without delay, 
                                                 
117 The full notice can be found at  
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/thaicl4efavirenz.html 
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notwithstanding the provisions of Section 46, 47 and 
47bis.  
In the circumstances under the above paragraph, the 
ministry or bureau or department shall submit its offer 
setting forth the amount of remuneration and conditions 
for the exploitation to the Director-General. The royalty 
rate shall be as agreed upon by the ministry or bureau 
or department and the patentee or his licensee, and the 
provisions of Section 50 shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
 
This legal provision authorizes the government to use compulsory licensing 
of patents to carry out any service for public consumption or to meet a list of 
specific public needs, including to prevent or relieve a severe shortage of 
drugs or other consumption items. The public notice as showed above 
contains appropriate statements invoking these authorized grounds. The 
notice also explains that the license is being used to help carry out a service 
for public consumption. It tells that the license will be used only for public 
health services and therefore is clearly aimed for non-commercial purposes 
and for public interests. This would be sufficient ground for the allowance of 
the compulsory license. As seen before in the section concerning the Doha 
Declaration, the WTO state members are not obliged to use the compulsory 
licensing of patents only in emergency situations of extreme public need, 
using the license to support a public program that responds to a public need 
is sufficient ground to justify the issuance of the license. 
 
Nevertheless, the public notice
118
 also brings a second ground for the 
license: to prevent or relieve a severe shortage of drugs or other consumption 
items. As seen before in this section, the license was needed to solve a 
shortage of efavirenz for the public treatment programs for the Thai 
HIV/AIDS patients. The notice explains: 
 
More than 1 million Thais have been infected with 
HIV, among this, more than 500,000 people are still 
alive. These infected individuals will eventually need 
long-term uses of antiretroviral drugs to maintain their 
productive lives. However, budget for health services in 
the national health security system allocated for HIV 
/AIDS patients in the fiscal year 2006 (B.E. 2549) is 
only 2,796.2 million baht for the target group of 82,000 
patients. 
 
The Thai Government has launched a policy of 
universal access to anti-retroviral since 1st October 
2003, and has a budget specifically allocated for them. 
However, it is still difficult to get access to some 
effective and safer anti-retroviral. The high price of 
these patented anti-retroviral has hindered their 
accessibility under the universal access policy. 
                                                 
118 Idem footnote 68 
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Efavirenz is a highly effective and safe anti-retroviral.   
It is also placed in the Thailand’s National List of Anti-
retroviral. However, the price of the patented Efavirenz 
is twice of those generics produced by WHO certified 
GMP factories in India.  With this higher price, the 
budget allocated from the Thai Government can only 
supply some patients with Efavirenz, whereas the rest 
has to use other non-patented and more toxic anti-
retroviral. 
 
Even though the compulsory license for efavirenz seems to be limited to use 
in the public health system, according to the Section 51 this use is not 
necessarily restricted to the public sector. The Thai law states that the 
purpose of these licenses is to address ―a severe shortage of (…) drugs or 
other consumption items‖. Hence, Section 51 could be used to authorize a 
compulsory license for use in the private sector as well, if the purpose is to 
address a shortage of needed medicines.  
 
Concerning the requirements for prior notice to the patent holder, Section 51 
does not require prior negotiation with the patent holder. It requires that the 
licensing authority ―notify the patentee in writing without delay, 
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 46, 47 and 47bis‖. The exemption 
from the requirements of Sections 46, 47 and 47bis make clear that the 
government is not required to wait until ―the expiration of three years from 
the grant of a patent of four years form the date of application‖, nor to have 
―made an effort to obtain a license from the patentee having proposed 
conditions and remuneration reasonably sufficient under the circumstances.‖ 
 
Regarding the question of royalties, still the Section 51 states that the 
ministry issuing the patent ―shall submit its offer setting forth the amount of 
remuneration and conditions for the exploitation to the Director-General‖. 
The royalty rate and terms must be either ―as agreed upon by the ministry or 
bureau or department and the patentee or his licensee,‖ or set in the of 
Section 50, which ―shall apply mutatis mutandis119‖ The reference to Section 
50 means that the authorizing ministry has the right to set a royalty absent 
agreement with the patent holder, which can be subject to appeal. It states 
the right of the Director General to set a royalty rate. 
 
The Department of Disease Control fixed a royalty and prescribed conditions 
of the license in its public notice and stated the intent to ―notify the patent 
owner and the Department of Intellectual Property, Ministry of Commerce 
immediately‖. The negotiations over the terms and royalty of the license 
should follow the public notice. 
 
If the patent holder and the government would not reach an agreement on the 
terms and royalty of the license, the patent holder can file an appeal of such 
terms without affecting the right of the Department to use the compulsory 
                                                 
119 mutatis mutandis, i.e. with the necessary changes. 
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license immediately, that is, to purchase the generic medications for its 
treatment program
120
. The ultimate decision to issue a compulsory license 
seems to be definitive according to the Thai law.  
 
5.2 Public Reaction 
The account of opinion expressions concerning the Thai compulsory 
licensing activity in the English speaking media is quite extraordinary. It 
denotes an important effort from both sides of the conflict to captivate the 
mass preference. In one side, the pro-pharmaceutical companies lobby 
attempt, at all costs, to demoralize the Thai government and its activities 
regarding health care system, and the intellectual property system of the 
country as a whole. On the other side, stand a myriad of activists, academics 
and government representatives, supporting and admitting to be inspired by 
the Thai actions.  
 
In this section I will give not but few examples of these two contrasting sides 
of the public opinion. With this, I intend to demonstrate how the business 
arena has been moved and manipulated so to disrupt the public 
understanding of the legal reality, that is, the international understanding 
expressed in the letters of the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration. 
The attempts to convince the public against the rightfulness of the Thai 
compulsory licensing can indicate a real life expression of the theory of the 
three arenas
121
.  
 
After the notification of the compulsory licensing, the United States 
government admitted that Bangkok had not violated any laws under the 
special provisions of the TRIPS
122
. However, the US Trade Representative’s 
Office (USTR) placed Thailand on the 2007´s list of countries that, in 
general, violate intellectual property rights, the US Government’s Priority 
Watch List
123. ―While the US acknowledges a country’s ability to issue such 
licenses in accordance with WTO rules, the lack of transparency and due 
process exhibited in Thailand represents a serious concern‖ 124, states the 
report, yet without clarifying which were the actions that lacked 
transparency or due process. Apparently the US wanted Thailand to 
negotiate with drug companies before issuing a compulsory license, an 
                                                 
120 Section 50 of the Thai Patent Act states in relevant part: ―The decision of the 
[Department] made under the first paragraph of the Section is appeal able to the Board 
within sixty days from the date on which such decision is received.‖ 
121 As previously seen in the Section 3 of this thesis. 
122 The copies of the documents sent to the Thai Government by the Congress of the United 
States, reaffirming Thailand’s right to issue the compulsory licensing can be found in the 
Appendix, Documents I and II.  
123 Announcing the 2007 Special 301 Report, the USTR lists the countries that were 
―elevated‖ to the list and those that remain. As well as those that are under ―watch‖. 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2007/April/SPECIAL_301_Report.h
tml  
124 The USTR 2007 Special 301 Watch List  
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2007/2007_Special_30
1_Review/asset_upload_file884_11123.pdf  
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action TRIPS does not require and something Thai officials claimed they 
tried to do unsuccessfully for two years before issuing the licenses
125
.  
 
Another pungent criticism came in the form of a campaign against the 
actions of the Thai government that ran in advertisements in the Bangkok 
Post, the Port Today, the Wall Street Journal and other vehicles of the 
international media. This campaign was leaded by the organization called 
―USA for Innovation‖. This organization was apparently lobbying for the 
US pharmaceutical companies. The only proofs of its existence were a 
website, a telephone number and an email address
126
. The leader of the USA 
for Innovation was known to be the former United Nations ambassador Ken 
Adelman; he is also a senior counselor public relations for a number of drug 
companies. The campaign states that the actions of the Thai government 
―hurts Thai patients‖ and ―most of Thailand’s AIDS patients will not have 
access to the world’s best medicines‖. The USA for innovation have 
launched a website www.thailies.com, which is also out of service today
127
. 
However, before the web site was extinct, the texts of the posts were copied. 
The posts in this website accused 10 supposed lies told about the Thai 
government. An example of the content of this
128
: 
 
―Is Thailand a poor country that cannot afford Western 
medicines? In fact, just the opposite is true. Thailand 
has the 21st largest economy in the world when 
measured by gross domestic product (GDP) derived 
from Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) calculations. 
According to the CIA World Fact Book 2007, 
Thailand's economy is more productive than over 200 
countries -- placing Thailand among the top ten percent 
of richest countries in the world. 
Earlier this month USTR noted that Thailand continues 
to suffer from "widespread commercial IPR 
counterfeiting and piracy." The new Thai military 
regime, which assumed power by coup last September, 
has now introduced direct government theft of 
American innovation into the quickly deteriorating 
U.S.- Thailand relationship through its theft of the 
intellectual property of three drugs produced by 
American and European companies.‖ 
 
The pro-pharmaceutical website claimed that ―Thailand’s actions violate the 
TRIPS agreement of the WTO‖ and ―WTO members are not allowed to 
issue compulsory licenses without full and transparent negotiations‖. After 
                                                 
125 IP Watch: Thailand Presents Report on Compulsory Licensing Experience http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=563  
126 The web site is no longer accessible, but a copy of the referred advertise can be found in 
the Appendix, Document III. 
127
 The USA for Innovation story, provided by 2Bangkok.com, can be seen in the 
Appendix, Document IV. 
128 More samples of the content of the ―thailies.com‖ website can be found in the Appendix, 
Document V. 
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accusing the Thai Public Health Ministry of ―threatening to kidnap 
American tourists‖, the advertisement goes on to say that the Thai 
government was ―stealing American assets for military benefit‖. The 
propaganda went on to state that most Thais that suffer with HIV/AIDS 
would ―not have access to the world’s best medicines‖, because they would 
be treated with locally manufactured drugs, such as the GPO-Vir. The GPO-
Vir is a HIV/AIDS treatment manufactured by GPO, the agency claims that 
the resistance rate for the drug is of 15%, while a study by the Mahidol 
University has found that the resistance rate is between 39,6% and 58%.
129
  
 
The criticism against the compulsory licensing of drugs adeptly fluctuates 
between fact and fiction, mixing legitimate concerns about democracy and 
military spending with half-truths about the legality of compulsory licensing 
and the costs of medicines in Thailand. An article published by the Wall 
Street Journal, amongst other vehicles, by Franklin Cudjoe, from Accra, 
Ghana, entitled ―Curing the Diseases of Poverty‖130, states 
 
―Last year, the Thai military government declared 
that it could not afford branded drugs to treat its 
citizens. So it issued compulsory licenses or patent 
suspensions, for two AIDS medications and one 
heart drug and began producing copies locally. 
Though the quality of the drugs was unknown, the 
move was hailed by activists as a victory for 
―patients over patents‖. But the generals weren’t 
really worried about patients. If public health 
concerns had been the prime motivation, the Thai 
government wouldn’t have refused the massive price 
reductions the patent holders had offered. 
(…) 
Far from noble act, Thailand’s compulsory licensing 
was a bold power play to beef up local 
manufacturing and generate revenues for a corrupt 
state. Unfortunately for Thai AIDS patients, 
producing the drugs locally has proved prohibitively 
expensive and has sharply limited their supply.‖ 
 
Contrasting examples to the above mentioned are the statements that praise 
and support Thailand’s compulsory licensing policy, which have also been 
significant. ―Medicines are a substantial element of health care costs, and it 
is entirely appropriate and necessary for the government of Thailand to find 
means of reducing these costs to ensure sustainable financing of health 
care‖, said a February letter to the Thai government written by the WHO 
director-general Dr Margaret Chan, which added that the compulsory 
                                                 
129 Bangkok Post: GPO may sue US lobby firm (accessed in March 10, 2008) 
 http://www.biothai.org/cgi-bin/content/news/show.pl?0466 and FTA Watch Group: PR War 
Over Cheap Drugs Causes Anger (accessed in March 10, 2008) 
http://www.ftawatch.org/cgi-bin/content/newse/show.pl?0745  
130 The Wall Street Journal: Curing the Diseases of Poverty (accessed in January 10, 2008) 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119430106912883083.html?mod=googlenews_wsj  
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licenses were ―fully in line with the TRIPS agreement‖131. The following 
fragment of this letter expresses the position of WHO regarding compulsory 
licensing of medicines and is a good example of the contrasting reactions to 
Thailand’s actions. 
 
―WHO unequivocally supports the use by 
developing countries of the flexibilities within the 
TRIPS agreement that ensure access to affordable, 
high quality drugs. This includes the use of 
compulsory licensing, as described in paragraph 6 of 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health. The decision whether to issue a 
compulsory license for a pharmaceutical product is a 
national one. There is no requirement for countries 
to negotiate with patent holders before issuing a 
compulsory license. As a global community we need 
to ensure the right balance between the immediate 
and urgent pressing need to provide affordable 
medicines to the many that need them and the need 
to provide continuous incentives for innovation.‖ 
 
―This can set a precedent, a new understanding, about what developing 
countries can do under TRIPS‖, stated Jacques-Chai Chomthongdi, a 
researcher at Focus on the Global South, a Bangkok-based think-tank. He 
also said ―this is to the advantage of developing countries‖. Paul Cawthorne 
of the Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF) added ―other countries will feel more 
confident in issuing compulsory licenses, rather than threatening to issue 
them but not doing so due to pressure‖ 132.  
 
An article by Lara Santoro, published by the Los Angeles Times in 9 
October 2007, argued that, ―Cheap HIV drugs are more important than 
patents‖133. She affirms, ―Thailand’s move was, and remains, in perfect 
observance of international Law‖. She wrote that the Thai government’s 
attempt to acquire a lifesaving drug has caused corporate indignation and 
government censure not for the standard reason that without the protective 
role of patents drug makers would fail to recover their research and 
development costs and consequently stop pursuing new drugs, she claims 
this cannot be true because ―more than half of all antiretroviral drugs 
patented in the US were researched entirely on US government grants, 
public money‖. According to Santoro, the real reason is that ―The 
pharmaceutical industry lives in fear of a cheap drug domino effect. 
Thailand’s compulsory license could inspire the entire continent of Africa – 
where 70% of the world’s 40 million HIV/AIDS cases are found – to issue 
for a series of drugs‖. 
 
                                                 
131 A copy of the letter can be found in the Appendix, Document VI. 
132 Human Rights Tribune: Thailand Turns Giant Pharma Killer http://www.humanrights-
geneva.info/article.php3?id_article=1649  
133 Los Angeles Times: Cheap Drugs are More Important than Patents 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-santoro9oct09,0,432447.story  
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The Financial Times published in September 2007 and article called ―Big 
pharma chiefs must look at the world differently to meet health 
challenges‖134, by Alex Hsieh. He wrote about an interview given by Tachi 
Yamada, the global health chief of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
he is the for research and development director of GlaxoSmithKline. Dr. 
Yamada said that ―the pharmaceutical industry’s future success will require 
a new generation of executives who can find a fresh way to look at the 
world’s health challenges and its neediest countries‖, and ―pharma was an 
industry n which it was almost too easy to be successful. It was a license to 
print money. In a way, that is how it lost its way. (…) It lost contact with the 
people it was supposed to serve‖. The author writes that this statement is 
―best illustrated by the recent spate of compulsory licensing – when poor 
countries react against pharmaceutical companies´ pricing for crucial drugs, 
such as HIV/AIDS, by breaking patents‖.  
 
The discussion is ongoing more than one year after those events took place. 
The above were only few examples of the statements given at the time of 
Thailand’s compulsory licensing for the three stated drugs. But then, why 
was the public reaction so strong concerning Thailand’s actions? That was 
not the first and only time compulsory licensing ever took place in the 
pharmaceutical industry. The following section will give some examples of 
other countries that also made moves towards this option. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
134 Financial Times: Big Pharma Chiefs must ―look at world differently‖ to Meet Health 
Challenges  
http://pharmaceuticalengineering.blogharbor.com/blog/_archives/2007/9/30/3262801.html  
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6 Brazil’s Compulsory Licensing on 
HIV/AIDS Patented Drugs  
Brazil and Thailand are two of the possibly most controversial countries 
when it comes to the dealing with patented drugs. Brazil has taken a 
different path than Thailand did, having finally issued the first compulsory 
license of a medicine some days after Thailand did so. Previously, Brazil 
used to ―threat‖ to compulsory license to achieve an advantage in 
negotiations with the pharmaceutical companies for reduced royalties. 
 
Due this Brazil’s threatening, 12 days before President Clinton left office, on 
January 8, 2001, the USTR filed a complaint against the Brazilian 
compulsory licensing law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
135
. USTR 
officials called this the ―Merck case‖. The matter was the Article 68 of the 
Brazilian Patent Act
136
, which allows compulsory licenses to be issued in 
situations where the patent holder does not locally manufacture the patented 
product (the ―local working provision‖). The US received a large amount of 
negative publicity, and on June 25, 2001, the Bush administration withdrew 
the complaint, after negotiating an agreement with Brazil
137
. Under this 
agreement, Brazil agreed to provide the US with advance notice if a license 
is issued under Article 68 of the Brazilian Patent Act, and disputes would be 
discussed through a bilateral ―Consultative Mechanism‖. The agreement was 
not made public.
138
 
 
On August 22, 2001, Brazilian Health Minister José Serra announced that 
the government would issue a compulsory license for the manufacture of the 
antiretroviral drug nelfinavir, made by Roche and marketed under the name 
Viracept, for the Brazilian pharmaceutical producer Far Manguinhos, in 
order to bring costs down 40 percent
139
. On August 28, the two parties 
resumed talks, and on August 31, they reached an agreement. Roche would 
sell the drug in Brazil at an additional 40% discount, and Brazil would not 
issue the compulsory license. This agreement was seen as a relief to the 
pharmaceutical industry. Already then, the fear was that, if Brazil had 
carried out its threat to ignore Roche´s patent on Viracept, a host of other 
developing countries might have followed its lead and begun manufacturing 
patented drugs for AIDS and other diseases
140
.  
 
                                                 
135 The request can be read at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/brazil/Req4EstabPanel.html 
(accessed in 11/02/2008) 
136 A version in English of selected Compulsory Licensing, Government Use, and Notable 
Patent Exception Provisions of the Brazilian Intellectual Property Law at  
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/brazil1.html (accessed in 11/02/2008) 
137 BBC UK news: US drops Brazil Aids drugs case  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1407472.stm  
138 New York Times: Brazil’s AIDS Chief Denounces Bush Position on Drug Patents 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/03/world/03NATI.html?ex=1202878800&en=aa0ad7ecba
c5a923&ei=5070 (accessed in 12/02/2008) 
139 Reuters news: Brazil to Violate Roche Patent on AIDS Drug 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/brazil/reuters08222001.html  
140 The New York Times news: Roche reaches accord on drug with Brazil  
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F01E4DC1130F932A3575AC0A9679C8B
63  
 48 
On September 5, 2003, the Brazilian government issued a decree that would 
allow it to produce or import generic anti-AIDS drugs without the consent of 
companies holding the patent on those medications. The Health Minister 
made it clear that the decree was meant to apply to antiretroviral drugs – 
specifically lopinavir, efavirenz and nelfinavir. The Ministry said in a 
statement it had negotiated with the name-brand companies in August 
seeking a reduction of more than 40%, but was offered maximum discount 
of 6.7%. Brazil and Merck reached an agreement in November, that year
141
.  
 
In 2005, the Brazilian Health Minister Humberto Costa signed a decree 
declaring the patent of Kaletra in the public interest and appropriate for 
compulsory licensing. A subsequent settlement with Abbott reduced the 
price of by 46%
142
. In the same year, the government of Brazil declared to be 
considering compulsory licensing for the manufacture of Viread. In May 
2006, Gilead and the Brazilian Health Minister reached an agreement to 
reduce the price of Viread in Brazil by approximately 50%. This process was 
viewed with displeasure by the pharmaceutical industry. Brian Kyhos, a 
spokesman for Abbot Laboratories, said ―the government is taking actions 
that will undermine initiatives seeking new and better treatment for AIDS. 
The respect to intellectual property is important as it leads to more 
investments‖143. 
 
In the begging of May 2007, a short while after Thailand’s compulsory 
licensing began, the government of Brazil finally issued a compulsory 
license on the efavirenz, after negotiations failed to bring about an 
agreement on price reductions with Merck
144. Merck said it was ―profoundly 
disappointed‖ and the US Chamber and US-Brazil Business Council stated 
that the decision on breaking the patent of Merck’s Sustiva (the brand name 
of efavirenz) was a ―major step backward‖ in intellectual property law and 
warned it could harm development Brazil is working to attract investment in 
innovative industries that rely on IP, and this move will likely cause 
investments to go elsewhere‖145. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
141 BBC news - New Anti-HIV Drug Deal for Brazil 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3281683.stm  
142
 PR News - The Government declares anti-retroviral Kaletra to be of public interest and 
will produce it in Brazil http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-
bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/06-25-2005/0003950348&EDATE=  
143 Bloomberg.com - Brazil Deputies Suspend Patents on AIDS drugs 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000086&sid=aqtnA4hCov2I&refer=latin_am
erica# 
144 Essential Drugs Organization - Brazilian Government Declares Efavirenz to be of Public 
Interest 
 http://www.essentialdrugs.org/edrug/archive/200704/msg00085.php 
145 U.S. Chamber of Commerce Press Statement - Brazil Takes Major Step Backward on 
Intellectual Property Rights, Says U.S. Chamber http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-
health/2007-May/011111.html  
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7 Analysis 
After seeing that Thailand and Brazil were not the first countries to use the 
TRIPS flexibility of compulsory licensing of patents in public interest for 
non-commercial use, one can wonder why did their actions cause so much 
commotion. 
 
Thailand is still struggling to restore a democratic politic system
146
, which 
does not necessarily pair with the liberal democratic ideals of the USA and 
Europe. Furthermore, Thailand did not limit the compulsory licensing for 
HIV/AIDS drugs. The country also licensed medicine for heart disease and 
is about to compulsory license cancer drugs. Brazil has a history of conflicts 
concerning compulsory licensing of medicine patents and many events, such 
as corruption scandals and urban violence, put the country in ―watch‖ by the 
developing world
147
. There was quite some discussion in the media when 
Brazil started threatening to use compulsory licensing, from 2001 and on, 
but at that time, due to rather confidential agreements, Brazil restrained from 
the issuance as such, as seen in the previous section. In 2007, however, the 
right for compulsory licensing was fully applied and the industry seems to 
have understood the risks of those events. 
 
The publicity given to the matter and the extensive criticism and praise it has 
received, caused the subject to reach even the population who normally does 
not take interest in intellectual property issues. Suddenly, those that did not 
have an opinion about pharmaceutical company business, intellectual 
property ethic questions or public health care, started discussing the matter 
and forming opinion in favour or against one or the other side. Another 
particular of these cases is that the countries responded to the public attacks 
in the same level, publishing articles and white papers as a response to 
virtually all manifestation of disagreement towards their actions. 
 
There was a ―statement war‖ in the media. In this war, one side wanted to 
take full advantage from the possibilities allowed by the international 
agreements. The other side wanted the public and political opinion to believe 
that those possibilities are neither fair nor efficient. None of them wanted to 
harm their own ―brand‖. The issuing countries, such as Brazil and Thailand, 
do not want to pose as risky for foreign investment, they do not want to be 
seen as disrespectful of intellectual properties nor of the public best interest. 
They want investors to trust in their security and legality, and they want their 
people to trust in their government’s intentions. The companies do not want 
to pose as disregardful of the peoples suffering, they do not want the public 
to believe that the price charged for life saving medicines is unfairly high 
and that they are not open for negotiation to reach a price that is convenient 
to all parties. They do not wish to be seen as the villains in the picture where 
millions are dying for lack of medicine, and they do not want to decrease 
profits and endanger their business model. The companies often state to 
                                                 
146 The Economist – Country Briefings: Thailand 
http://www.economist.com/countries/Thailand/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Forecast 
147 The Economist – Country Briefings: Brazil 
http://www.economist.com/countries/Brazil/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Forecast 
 50 
remain open for negotiation. ―Merck has attempted to negotiate in good faith 
with the government of Brazil, but a fair offer on Stocrin has been rejected,‖ 
it said. ―While we remain flexible and committed to exploring a mutually 
acceptable agreement with the Brazilian government to help the country 
achieve its objective of universal access to treatment, we believe their action 
is not in the best interests of patients in Brazil and around the world‖148. 
And, ―Last year, America’s pharmaceutical research companies invested 
more than $55 billion to bring new and innovative products to market to 
provide treatment for virtually every disease known to mankind. This 
research is costly and time consuming, but it is undertaken because of our 
industry’s continued commitment to improving and saving lives 
everywhere‖149, stated Billy Tauzin, from the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America.  
 
While some developed countries sustain the vital importance of patent 
protection for the development and improvement of medicines, other 
countries, such as Canada, count with pharmaceutical companies, such as 
Apotex, that manage to take the momentous situation to explore the legality 
of compulsory licensing and sell inexpensive HIV/AIDS drugs to the least 
developed world, as seen in section 4.3. With this, the company as well as 
the country, pose as a politically correct and engaged in the care of those that 
most need
150
.  
 
Both Thailand and Brazil, as seen in the previous sections, were accused of 
―breaking‖ the patents of the medicines. But, in the words of Professor Peter 
Drahos, from the Australian National University, which are valid to Brazil as 
well as to Thailand, ―Brazil’s action will not ―break Merck’s Brazilian 
patent. The patent has not been revoked by the Brazilian government. The 
patent continues to operate and Merck remains its owner. Merck will receive 
royalties based on its use‖151. 
 
The strong opposition by part of the industry and even some governmental 
agencies against the actions of Brazil and Thailand are of such a forcefulness 
that are suggested to have a discouraging effect for smaller economies 
considering similar public health actions, but lack the legal or political 
resources to defend themselves on the global stage. In other words, perhaps 
those larger, stronger developing countries such as Brazil and Thailand are 
being opposed in this way so to serve as an example of what can be done to 
other countries that try to do the same. 
 
The validity of the use of compulsory licenses in accordance to the TRIPS 
agreement is subtly challenged and a sagacious trade threatening is often the 
                                                 
148 IP Watch – Brazil Takes Step to Import Cheaper AIDS drugs under Trade Law 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=614 
149 Phrma – Compulsory Licensing Trend Dangerous 
http://www.phrma.org/news_room/press_releases/phrma%3a_compulsory_licensing_trend_d
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150 Essential Drugs: Rwanda to import of patented medicines under compulsory license 
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151 Idem footnote 149 
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content of the messages for those that attempt to compulsory license. An 
example is the view of the Geneva based International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations, ―Although permitted under 
specific conditions by the WTO TRIPS agreement, compulsory licensing is 
not a solution to improve access to medicines. Improved access can only be 
assured by adequate financing and collaboration with the innovative 
companies that develop new therapies. Compulsory licensing is a 
confrontational approach, and may be aimed to benefit local government-
owned companies´ commercial interest‖152. Some pharmaceutical industry 
representatives have even admitted to put pressure in their governments to 
―limit or cancel trade agreements that may affect wider economic 
development‖153.  
 
The communicative efforts to shake the compulsory licensing possibilities 
become clear when noticing the use of terms such as ―breaking the patents‖ 
or ―revoking the patents‖ instead of ―compulsory licensing of patents‖. 
These expressions have different communicative strengths, while 
international agreements and institutions support compulsory licensing and it 
implies the payment of royalties; the breaking patents is highly illegal in 
most countries of the world and it implies complete disrespect to the 
intellectual property institutions. 
 
Furthermore, the pharmaceutical industry claims to offer the lowest possible 
prices in the negotiations pre-compulsory license. Dr  Krikorian, a researcher 
at the Research Center on Health, Social and Political Issues, from the 
university of Paris, said ―Brazil achieved lower prices in the past using the 
threat of compulsory license. However, there has certainly been an erosion 
of the power of the threats since none of them actually led to a compulsory 
license. In addition, the prices offered by the companies were clearly not the 
lowest possible‖. Dr Krikorian continued his analysis by saying ―the most 
obvious reason [on why Brazil has not issued a compulsory license before] is 
the fear of an open conflict with the United States. The Thai case, and the 
recent 301 list report, indeed shows that despite the Doha Declaration and all 
the commitments made, the US is ready to be extremely aggressive with 
countries with producing capacity that use compulsory licensing for 
medicines‖154. This statement shows that the manoeuvres of the 
pharmaceutical industry, and of the government of the countries where they 
are based, even though made in the business arena - which means that no 
actual legal action is taken - have considerable effects in political and legal 
decisions. This reaction could mean that the business and political arena can 
be manipulated by communicative efforts; and that this manipulation can 
cause effects in the other arenas. 
 
                                                 
152 Idem 115 
153 Pharmaceutical Business Review – Breaking Merck Patent May Drive Investment Away 
from Brazil  
http://www.pharmaceutical-business-review.com/article_feature.asp?guid=8A869BFC-
88A5-4131-8CA3-231EE6F6E46C  
154 Idem 115 
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However, the attempt to manipulate the public opinion and to control the 
actions of other parties is not a guarantee of success, it is still just an attempt 
to defend ones interests. The truth is that an active example can encourage 
more than half empty accusations and threatening. The danger is that the 
argument for previous negotiation, used by the industry, can be ruined by 
facts. According to Dr Ellen t´Hoen of the Médecins Sans Frotières, the 
actions of Thailand and Brazil are a lesson for other developing countries 
that one actually gets lower prices by issuing a compulsory license instead of 
only threatening to issue one. Brazil has achieved a price for efavirenz of 
$580 per patient per year earlier when it had threatened to use compulsory 
license. But this was too expensive compared with the price for generics 
(Thailand was offered $244 per patient per year after it issued a compulsory 
license), and thus Brazil has paid too much for too many years
155
. 
 
The result of this communicative war, where one side fights for less 
expensive public health care solutions and the other side fights for the 
maintenance of a profitable industry, can culminate in what James Love, the 
director of the Knowledge Ecology International, has predicted in his 
statement on the compulsory licensing of Efavirenz
156
.  
 
"With Brazil and Thailand expanding the market for 
generic versions of efavirenz, greater economies of 
scale should push prices down further, eventually to 
less than $.24 per day.  We hope also that Efavirenz 
can be included in new generic fixed dose 
combinations, including those using TDF and FTC, 
products now sold by Gilead, and licensed to some 
generic producers in some countries. 
 
James Love also put words to what can be a reason for the negative reaction 
from the pharmaceutical industry. He said that, at some point, it will be 
necessary to reassess the business model for medicines in developing 
countries. ―Negotiations with patent owners rarely produce affordable 
prices. Competition is more effective‖, he wrote. And continued advising 
that Brazil should go far beyond this single product (the efavirenz), and 
create a system of collective management of intellectual property rights that 
would extend compulsory license for either all prescription medicines, or a 
set of essential medicines that includes not only AIDS, but other important 
health problems, like diabetes, cancer, or heart disease. 
 
This is what Thailand has been doing. As seen previously, at the same 
moment as the country issued the compulsory licenses on the HIV/AIDS 
medicines, it did the same on the heart disease drug. Now, in this beginning 
of 2008, Thailand disputes compulsory licensing three cancer drugs
157
, 
                                                 
155 Idem 115 
156 James Love – Statement on Brazil and Thailand Compulsory Licensing 
http://www.keionline.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=46 
157
 Reuters - Thailand will override cancer drug patents (March 10, 2008) 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/healthNews/idUKBKK14764720080310 
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which will probably continue to raise steaming discussions in the 
international arenas.  
 
The debate also evolves around the question of who bares the burden of 
R&D costs for the continuous innovation of medicines, and whether or not 
the compulsory licensing can indeed represent the end of the incentives for 
pharmaceutical companies to keep researching for cures or relieves for 
diseases that attack mostly the developing world, such as malaria, that kills 
an African child every 30 seconds, and tuberculosis, with which one-third of 
the world’s population is infected158. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
158 Reuters Foundation’s Fact Sheet - Top killer diseases in the developing world. 
http://www.alertnet.org/topkillerdiseases.htm (accessed on 24 August, 2007) 
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8 Conclusion 
As the public priorities of the society and the notion of justice evolve, so do 
the law and the acceptable ways of enforcing it. The people’s understanding 
of what is right and what is wrong and how they act upon this, influences 
the concepts of what is legal. What is communicated in the business – and 
political arena, tends to have direct influence in the public opinion. Which, 
by its turn, influences the daily events that affect the lives of millions. 
 
At the time of the conclusion of this study Thailand have just had its 
presidential elections and the new Minister of Health is about to face 
impeachment for having started to review the previous government’s 
initiated policy on compulsory licensing.
159
 That shows the public 
disagreement with the government’s inability to fight the threats of trade 
sanction from the developing world. Brazil, in its turn, has ceased the 
compulsory licensing activities that have received so many previous support 
and encouragement. 
 
The true reason why the compulsory licensing efforts by the developing 
countries is received with so much hostility from the developed world is 
unknown to me. That is, perhaps, one of the further questions that could be 
examined in a continuation to this thesis.  
 
My most outstanding conclusion after this study is that the law, on its own, 
does not have the strength to produce the results it was intended for. That 
probably happens for various reasons, which can, also, be subject of further 
study. Some of these reasons, I speculate, could be the very nature of the 
law in question, its relation to the society it is intended to rule, the business 
forces and international trade relations. I perceived that the reactions to the 
use of a legal instrument must be pre analysed and taken into consideration 
by those that intend to take an innovative step in the international relations 
and business arenas. As seen, the counteract from the lobbyists and from the 
governments that support them can be fierce and can actually harm the 
political and social harmony of entire nations. This case of the governmental 
compulsory licensing of medicines although being of international 
resonance, can be also illustrative in cases of smaller reach, such as local 
licensing of patents and other moves that may have legal sustainability but 
can be vulnerable business and politically wise.   
 
One realization I came to with the analysis of this case is that concepts such 
as dominant position and communicative strength have indeed played an 
important role in the reality of the dispute. Even though Thailand and Brazil 
have the legal right to compulsory license medicine patents, and even 
though the procedure applied was according to the law, the dominant 
position of the United States government and of the pharma giants and their 
strong communicative efforts have, so far, outcome the legal rights. 
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I do not think that the compulsory licensing of patented drugs for public 
non-commercial use, supported by the WTO Agreements, has yet met its 
end. On the contrary, I believe that much will still happen in this scene. The 
future events will teach us even more about the international business and 
political forces, the three arenas where they are displayed and, specially, 
how can these be used for the final creation of value, for the management of 
risk and, hopefully, for the development of a global welfare.  
 
No matter what Thailand decides to do regarding the cancer drugs 
compulsory licensing, or what Brazil decides to do regarding the 
continuation of its AIDS program, the TRIPS flexibilities and its practical 
benefits to the population have already been exposed. The reaction of the 
citizens in Thailand against the apparent desistance of its government to 
continue what has been started indicates that public awareness has been 
created. This awareness has the strength to influence the democratic and the 
social processes of our era. 
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The USA for Innovation story
ThaiMyths.com site gone - September 29, 2007 
USA for Innovation finally disappears - August 25, 2007 
Time to accept USA for Innovation for what it is (was) - June 9, 2007 
"Charity" or "corporate-funded campaigning group"? - May 11, 2007
The media talks about USA for Innovation - May 9, 2007
"USA for Innovation" - A made-to-order lobbying effort - 7:31am, April 29, 2007
Above: USA for Innovation's Executive Director was Ken Adelman
ThaiMyths.com site gone - September 29, 2007 
The ThaiMyths.com site, set up by USA for Innovation, has just disappeared from the net. Previously, USA for Innovation, a short-lived
website set up to pressure the Thai regime, stopped posting two days after deposed PM Thaksin ended his association with lobbying
group Edelman.
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Above: USA for Innovation on August 23, 2007
USA for Innovation finally disappears - August 25, 2007 
USA For Innovation was the fake lobbying site set up by PR company Edelman to pressure the Thai military junta. The site pretended to
have a long history with many press releases and an on-going mission to target Brazilian and Thai compulsory drug licensing, but the
reality is that the site suddenly appeared in April, 2007.
Deposed PM Thaksin reportedly ended his association with Edelman on May 7. USA for Innovation's last post was on May 9. USA for
Innovation's sister site, Thaimyths.com, set up to highlight a series of press releases from May 7-18, is still up.
Proof of the big money behind the site was the enlistment of Kenneth Adelman to front the website and even record a YouTube video -
"The government of Thailand won't let me talk to the people of Thailand, since they block this YouTube message..."
Inside of Thailand you can download the video here (11MB) and watch it with Miro (formerly Democracy Player).
More about the short history of this mysterious site is below.
Time to accept USA for Innovation for what it is (was) - June 9, 2007 
The USA for Innovation site went silent on May 9. The companion site ThaiMyths.com ran from May 7 to May 18 and then went silent as
well. 
Based on its short history, USA for Innovation is 
- an organization with no history before April 2007 (despite a huge directory of press releases, none of these were released to the net on
the alleged dates they were created)
- an organization whose web attacks have no precedent in lobbying--except for the lobbying group Edelman which is well-known for
creating fake lobbying efforts and planting articles and opinion pieces in the press (just like this).
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- an organization that could afford an expensive hired gun like Kenneth Adelman
- an organization that seems satisfied to cease activity on May 18. Thaksin reportedly ended his association with Edelman on May 7.
"Charity" or "corporate-funded campaigning group" - May 11, 2007 
From the forum: The cited article in the Chicago Sun-Times [Thailand violates drug patents for its own profit] signs off with:"Philip
Stevens is health program director at the International Policy Network, a London-based charity..."
In an opinion piece in The Nation, the author is described as "Philip Stevens is director of the health programme at the International
Policy Network, a London-based development think tank." This is the same description Newsweek uses.
Sourcewatch calls International Policy Network a "corporate-funded campaigning group" that specializes in pharmaceutical and patent
issues. Regardless of media outlets' misleading descriptions, the International Policy Network appears to be another lobbying group. 
It is interesting how the USA for Innovation ad in The Nation on May 9, 2007 (below left) uses the same points as the Philip Stevens'
article.
Also: USA For Innovation Announces Advertising Campaign In Thailand - Bangkok Post,
May 10, 2007
USA for Innovation today announced an advertising campaign in Thailand aimed at
highlighting Thailand's theft of American and European medical technology at the expense
of the poor and sick. The advertisement, a full-page ad in The Nation, highlights the actions
of Health Minister Mongkol Na Songkhla, which hurt jobs, investment and access to safe
medicines for the people of Thailand...
Also: A peculiar article from the International Policy Network website: Myths on AIDS
prevalence
HIV/AIDS figures in India will have to be drastically slashed as a result of more accurate
HIV data. But United Nation’s Programme on AIDS (UNAIDS) continues to stand by its
exaggerated guesstimates that distort the magnitude of the Indian epidemic...
Ads by Google Thailand Thai Bangkok Spa Bangkok Inns Bangkok Tour
Above: ThaiMyths.com (also ThaiLies.com)
The media talks about USA for Innovation
Adelman spin the latest attack in the 'war from outside' - The Nation, May 11, 2007
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...Since his background has been in the field of defence, with close ties to hardcore American conservatives, you must wonder why he
dislikes the Thai military regime so much. Don't they belong to the same species - more power and higher military budgets?
But wait a minute, his bio says that he is senior counsellor at Edelman Public Relations. Do you know why now?
Thaksin Shinawatra, the ousted prime minister, hired Edelman Public Relations to represent him and to help prop up his international
image. The Nation earlier reported that he signed a public-relations contract with Edelman in a deal worth US$300,000 (Bt10.3 million).
Edelman Public Relations was responsible for most of Thaksin's media exposure with CNN, Time magazine, The Wall Street Journal
and the like earlier this year when he launched a PR blitz to boost his international image.
...The outsiders set the rules - freedom of expression by YouTube, free trade by the US, high drug costs by pharmaceutical companies -
we only have to follow.
Increasingly, we'll face more and more people like Ken Edelman, who has hardly ever set foot in Thailand, but who is willing to crush us
to the ground with his black heart.
Ex-president blasts Abbott on standoff with Thailand - Waukegan News , May 11, 2007
...Standing next to the Thai health minister, Clinton strongly endorsed decisions by Thailand and Brazil to break patents held by
American drug manufacturers to make their own versions of the drugs. The former president also said some of the prices charged by
American drug companies are "exorbitant..."
The Nation's statement on USA Innovation ad - The Nation, May 12, 2007 
USA FOR INNOVATION - GPO may sue over adverts - The Nation, May 12, 2007 
New 'Thailies' website spurs strong reaction - Bangkok Post, May 9, 2007 
The government has increased its internet monitoring operations after the American lobby group USA for Innovation announced it had
launched a new anti-Thai government website, www.Thailies.com. ''We will check the background of the website operator to see if it has
any hidden agenda,'' said government spokesman Yongyuth Mayalap...
Official: U.S. ex-President Clinton backs Thai move to break patents on AIDS drugs - IHT, May 8, 2007
Former U.S. President Bill  Clinton supports Thailand's move to break patents on AIDS drugs to lower their cost for poor patients, the
Thai health minister said Wednesday.
Public Health Minister Mongkol Na Songkhla, who met with Clinton on Tuesday, is visiting the U.S. to explain Thailand's decision to
break patents on three drugs, including the AIDS drugs Kaletra produced by Abbott Laboratories and Efavirenz by Merck. Both are
American companies...
Thaksin ends PR contract amid flak - The Nation, May 7, 2007 
Deposed prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra has terminated his association with United States-based public relations company
Edelman...
Thai AIDS activist: US is "devil disguised" - Gay.com, May 3, 2007
Thailand joins China, India among worst copyright offenders - IANS, May 1, 2007
Thailand has joined China, India and nine other countries that top the US list of worst offenders of international copyright rules, the US
government said...
Thailand scolded over not honoring patents - Tribune, April  30, 2007
Thai coup leaders hire PR company - BBC, April 30, 2007
...It signals a battle over the image of the country, which has been the subject of some recent negative publicity.
Its ousted and exiled former Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, has hired lobbyists and PR agents in the US...
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Above: Part of the full page ad placed in The Wall Street Journal
"USA for Innovation" - A made-to-order lobbying effort? - 7:31am, April 29, 2007
A forum thread on this subject is here.
Update: 19:11, April  29, 2007 - Traditional media is beginning to cover this story--along the lines we have laid out
here. Just remember that 2Bangkok.com had the story first.
Is "USA for Innovation" a fake lobbying group set up only to attack the current Thai government?
With perfect timing, this new lobbying effort has appeared and targeted the Thai military government. Practically overnight, a Google
search returns 24,300 hits for "USA for Innovation" (as of the writing of this article) and they all appear to refer to the press releases this
lobbying group has issued over the last few days.
USA for Innovation's sparse website has a news page with occasional press releases going back to 2005, but only the recent Thai
patent issue has multiple press releases. There is also a gap, nearly a year long, between press releases from May 2006 to April  2007.
Pre-April  2007 press releases from USA for Innovation do not appear to have been released to PR Web or other press release
websites. Pre-April  2007 press releases do not even appear on Google--perhaps indicating they were only recently placed on the
website to give USA for Innovation a plausible history before this April. Archive.org shows no activity for the site either.
The broad sweep of issues addressed in both the USA for Innovation website and its Wall Street Journal ad is peculiar for a lobbying
group that ostensibly is concerned with pharmaceutical issues. Taking the angle of "Slouching towards Burma" and "Radical new
regime" could indicate a broader agenda than just focusing on protecting patents. Calling the PM a "Military Dictator," bringing up
"targeted 'disappearances'" in the deep south, attacking military spending, and trying to highlight YouTube censorship seems to go far
beyond what would be expected from a typical lobbying group attempting a diplomatic solution to a patent issue.
This PR initiative comes at a suspiciously opportune time as pro-Thaksin groups attempt to build on issues from the draft constitution to
destabilize the government before the momentous rulings on disbanding the Thai Rak Thai party at the end of May. 
According to SourceWatch, USA for Innovation's Executive Director Ken Adelman is also a senior counselor to Edelman. Edelman is the
PR firm hired by former PM Thaksin Shinawatra.
2Bangkok.com is attempting to contact USA for Innovation, Edelman, and Baker Botts for comment.
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Above: For those of you who cannot see YouTube in Thailand, here is a screen grab of USA for Innovation's site. So far the comments
on the clip are overwhelmingly negative. On the USA for Innovation website there is a strangely broad explanation of the YouTube
blocking: Thailand's government censors speech within the country, including anything from YouTube, a service it considers to be
dangerous and subversive.
Some interesting press release from the site:
Thailand's Military is Sucking Money Away from Public Health - April  26, 2007
Military Regime Continues to Censor Free Speech in Thailand - April  26, 2007
USA For Innovation's Executive Director Ken Adelman will today release a message to the people of Thailand regarding the importance
of innovation and concerns about the Thai Government's recent endorsement of theft of American intellectual property.
This message will be available via Google's YouTube service this afternoon beginning at 3:00pm PT at the USA For Innovation YouTube
website...
Troubles from Thailand - Washington Times, April  27, 2007
... Most recently, the government brazenly announced it was breaking patents on drugs produced by Western corporations. And while
this action is in line with the rampant theft of U.S. innovation in Thailand, it is also glaringly self-serving. An official Thai spokesman
admitted busting patents "will be good for local pharmaceutical companies to improve their capacity." Perhaps unsurprising, one local
pharmaceutical supplier happens to be owned by the Thai government, the Government Pharmaceutical Organization.
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USA for Innovation Launches ThaiLies.com
         Website Highlights Deceit by Thailand's Minister of Health
    WASHINGTON, May 7 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- ThaiLies.com
(http://www.thailies.com), a project of USA for Innovation, was unveiled
today to draw attention to the deceit in Thailand's decision to steal
American and European innovation. Each business day for two weeks from May
7 - May 18, ThaiLies.com will release additional information regarding one
of the ten recent lies by the Health Minister Mongkol na Songkhla.
    Today's Lie
    Is Thailand a poor country that cannot afford Western medicines?
    In fact, just the opposite is true. Thailand has the 21st largest
economy in the world when measured by gross domestic product (GDP) derived
from Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) calculations. According to the CIA World
Fact Book 2007, Thailand's economy is more productive than over 200
countries -- placing Thailand among the top ten percent of richest
countries in the world.
    Earlier this month USTR noted that Thailand continues to suffer from
"widespread commercial IPR counterfeiting and piracy." The new Thai
military regime, which assumed power by coup last September, has now
introduced direct government theft of American innovation into the quickly
deteriorating U.S.- Thailand relationship through its theft of the
intellectual property of three drugs produced by American and European
companies.
    #1 of 10
    Lie: Thailand is a poor country and cannot afford Western medicines.
    Fact: Thailand Has One Of The Largest Economies In The World.
    Thailand has the 21st largest economy in the world when measured by
gross domestic product (GDP) derived from Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
calculations. Many experts believe analyzing economic activity using PPP is
the most accurate method because it allows comparisons in living standards
by taking into account the relative cost of living and the inflation rates
of the countries. According to the CIA World Fact Book 2007, Thailand's
economy is more productive than over 200 countries -- placing Thailand
among the top ten percent of richest countries in the world.
    (CIA Fact Book, Accessed 5/3/07)
    Fact: Thailand's Economy Is Growing Faster Than Over 100 Countries
Across The Globe.
    In 2006, Thailand's economy grew at a 4.8 percent clip -- ahead of 106
other countries around the world. Among the countries whose growth were
outpaced by Thailand were the United States (3.4%), Switzerland (2.9%) and
the United Kingdom (2.7%).
    (CIA Fact Book, Accessed 5/3/07)
    Fact: Thailand Has The 17th Lowest Unemployment Rate In The World.
    According to the CIA World Fact Book, in 2006 Thailand's unemployment
rate was only 2.1 percent -- over half the rate of the United States (4.8%)
and about one-third the unemployment rate in Canada (6.4%).
    (CIA Fact Book, Accessed 5/3/07)
    Fact: Thailand's Exports Total Over $123 Billion -- Ahead Of Almost 200
Countries In The World.
    In 2006, it is estimated that Thailand exported $123.5 billion, ahead
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of Australia ($117 billion) or India ($112 billion).
    (CIA Fact Book, Accessed 5/3/07)
    Fact: Thailand's Industrial Production Is Growing At A Faster Rate Than
The European Union, Japan, And 100 Other Countries.
    In 2006, Thailand's industrial output grew six percent -- double the
growth of industrial production worldwide. Thailand's output was well ahead
of Japan's 3.2 percent growth and the European Union's 2.6 percent.
    (CIA Fact Book, Accessed 5/3/07)
    About USA for Innovation and ThaiLies.com
    USA For Innovation is a non-profit organization dedicated to the
protection of intellectual property and continued innovation around the
globe. USA For Innovation educates decision makers, the media and general
public about threats to innovation. ThaiLies.com is a project of USA for
Innovation intended to expose the web of deceit by Thailand's Health
Ministry. For additional information, please contact us at 866-646-8668 or
john@usaforinnovation.org.
SOURCE USA for Innovation
back to top
Related links:
http://www.thailies.com
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